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Be Careful What You Wish for: Why Hobby Lobby
Weakens Religious Freedom
Frank S. Ravitch*
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., which brought for-profit corporations under the
protection of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, has been the
subject of widespread support and criticism. Some have lauded the
Hobby Lobby decision as an important step in protecting religious
freedom. Others have derided it as an affront to the civil rights of
corporate employees. This Article suggests a third perspective, namely,
that Hobby Lobby harms, rather than helps, religious freedom. Both
legally and politically, Hobby Lobby is likely to lead to a reduction in
protection for religious individuals and entities that have traditionally
been included under the Free Exercise Clause and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act. This is particularly troubling because the
Hobby Lobby decision is legally flawed. The Article takes seriously the
reality that many religious people do not experience religion as a
divisible phenomenon that they can separate from the rest of their lives.
Sometimes this requires exemptions to generally applicable laws if there
is a legal mechanism for doing so, but cases involving large, for-profit
entities like Hobby Lobby raise additional concerns. In these cases,
religious individuals seek exemptions in the name of the company, which
imposes the owners’ religious tenets on corporate employees. This creates a
confrontation between “lived religion” and the legal or civil rights of
others. Over time, as courts create precedent in cases involving for-profit
entities, the rights of religious individuals and religious entities will
likely be weakened. Moreover, the legislative, legal, and public response
to Hobby Lobby does not bode well for religious accommodation claims
in the long run, and, sadly, will have a negative impact on
accommodation claims brought by religious individuals and entities.
* Professor of Law and Walter H. Stowers Chair in Law and Religion, Michigan State
University College of Law. I am grateful to the participants at the Annual Law & Religion
Roundtable held at Stanford Law School in June, 2013 for inspiring this article and for helpful
feedback along the way. I am also grateful to colleagues who attended my faculty workshop on
this article at the Michigan State University College of Law for helpful feedback.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby, 1 has been hailed by some as an important step in protecting
religious freedom. This article explains that Hobby Lobby will be a
pyrrhic victory—if a victory at all—for religious freedom. Both
legally and politically, Hobby Lobby is likely to lead to a reduction in
protection for religious individuals and entities that have traditionally
been included under the Free Exercise Clause and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). 2 Simply put, in the long run the
Hobby Lobby Court’s expansion of RFRA to protect closely held, forprofit entities regardless of their size, and to potentially allow
religious freedom claims to harm third parties, will weaken religious
freedom for individuals and traditional religious entities. This is
particularly troubling because, as this Article asserts, the Hobby Lobby
decision is legally flawed.
This is not to understate the stakes in cases like Hobby Lobby.
Many religious people do not experience religion as a divisible

1. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
2. See infra Part III.
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phenomenon that they can separate from the rest of their lives.3
Under RFRA, religious exemptions to generally applicable laws are
available unless the government has a compelling interest to deny the
exemption and can meet the narrow-tailoring requirement. 4 This
makes sense for claims by individuals and religious entities, which
were the original focus of RFRA. But cases involving large, for-profit
entities like Hobby Lobby raise additional concerns. In these cases,
religious individuals seek exemptions in the name of the company,
which imposes the owners’ religious tenets on corporate employees
in contexts where many of those imposed upon are not of the same
faith (or the same perspective from within a faith). 5 This creates a
confrontation between what this Article calls “lived religion” and the
legal or civil rights of others.
It was clear long before Hobby Lobby that RFRA and the Free
Exercise Clause apply to religious individuals and the houses of
worship where many come together to practice their religion. 6
Moreover, it was also clear that some other religious entities were
protected. 7 Yet, until recently, it seemed unlikely that for-profit

3. MEREDITH B. MCGUIRE, LIVED RELIGION: FAITH AND PRACTICE IN EVERYDAY
LIFE (2008) (exploring religion and spirituality in daily practices and explaining that religion
should be defined based on how it is lived every day rather than how religious entities define
it); RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 250 (2d ed. 1986) (explaining that when people make religion significant in their
lives they often seek to conform all aspects of their life to their religious commitments); see also
Steven H. Resnicoff, A Jewish Look at Lawyering Ethics—A Preliminary Essay, 15 TOURO L.
REV. 73, 77–78 (1998) (“[T]he nature of Jewish law is that it is a 24-hour a day, 7-day a week
religion with prescribed rules for virtually every activity. A Jew is not entitled to separate her
existence into discrete personal and professional lives; the same religious guidelines govern
business as well as private conduct.”); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Some Political Implications of
Religious Belief, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 419, 430 (1990) (“A religious
believer’s inability to live her life consistent with her ultimate concern—her deepest and most
compelling reality—puts in question the meaning of her life, and undermines her
very existence.”).
4. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012).
5. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2795–96 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Caroline Mala
Corbin, The Contraception Mandate, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1469, 1481–82 (2013).
6. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (individuals); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972) (individuals); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C.,
132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (religious entities); Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao
do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (religious entities).
7. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768–69 (noting that non-profit religious corporations
are covered under RFRA). The Hobby Lobby Court asserts that because non-profit religious
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entities—or at least those that are not sole proprietorships—would
enjoy protection under RFRA or the Free Exercise Clause. 8 This
does impose significant burdens on those who operate for-profit
businesses in the public sphere, but as the Court explained in United
States v. Lee, that is part of the price for operating a profit-making
business. 9 Or so we thought.
Until recently, the “Culture Wars” in the U.S. had not led to
widespread political or public disagreement over accommodating
religious individuals, and even religious entities, 10 except perhaps in
the context of religious exemptions for medical professionals and
facilities. 11 In fact, exemptions to generally applicable laws for
religious people were not controversial when RFRA was passed with
extensive bi-partisan and public support in 1993. 12 RFRA was a
reaction to the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v.
Smith. 13 In Smith, the Court formally abandoned a line of cases
requiring government to provide religious exemptions to generally
applicable laws absent a compelling interest and narrow tailoring. 14
Smith effectively held there is no duty to provide such exemptions.15
The public response was swift and overwhelming. RFRA was passed
by a vast majority in Congress (97-3 in the Senate; unanimous in the

corporations are covered by RFRA, for-profit corporations should be covered. Id. The
numerous problems with this argument are discussed infra at Parts II and IV.
8. Id. at 2795 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,
261 (1982).
9. Lee, 455 U.S. at 255, 261.
10. Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the Limits of
Legislative Power, 73 TEX. L. REV. 247, 248 (1994) (explaining that RFRA was widely
supported when passed); Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U.
ILL. L. REV. 839, 845–46 (2014) (noting that religious accommodations and RFRA have
“become far more controversial than [they] used to be”); cf. Douglas NeJaime & Reva B.
Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE
L.J. 2516 (2015) (explaining that complicity-based claims are different and more controversial
than traditional claims for religious accommodation, and that complicity based claims have
increased in recent years).
11. Laycock, supra note 10, at 846–48; NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 10, at 2535–37.
12. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S
TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 157–58, 160–61 (2008); Ronald J. Colombo, The
Naked Private Square, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 42 (2013).
13. 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Idleman, supra note 10, at 248.
14. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 883–86.
15. Id.
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House), 16 and was signed by President Clinton. 17 RFRA was also
supported by an incredibly diverse group of civil liberties and
religious groups. 18
When the Court held four years later that Congress had
exceeded its authority by applying RFRA to the states, 19 a number of
states passed state RFRAs or amended state constitutions to include
broader religious freedom provisions. 20 Other states continued to
interpret their state constitutions in a manner consistent with preSmith law. 21 None of this was seen as terribly controversial at the
time. Yet in recent years RFRA has become a central issue in the
Culture Wars in the United States, 22 and state RFRAs are now
subject to serious opposition. 23
What accounts for this shift in public and political opinion? The
answer is highly complex, but two interrelated factors have clearly
contributed: first, a sense that religious people are trying to force
their beliefs and morals on others through government
accommodations of religion 24 and, second, related to the first, a
sense that exemptions for religious individuals and entities are likely
to lead to discrimination against innocent third parties. 25 Each of
these concerns will be addressed in this Article.
There is something to be said for both of these concerns. Yet, in
most religious exemption cases, neither apply, and in fact many
claims for religious exemptions have little or no effect on anyone
other than the believer(s) or religious entity involved. Individuals
16. Idleman, supra note 10, at 248.
17. President William J. Clinton, Remarks on Signing the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993, Nov. 16, 1993, in 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2377.
18. See Idleman, supra note 10.
19. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
20. Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55
S.D. L. REV. 466, 474–76 (2010).
21. See Christine M. Durham, What Goes Around Comes Around: The New Relevancy of
State Constitution Religion Clauses, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 353, 366 (2004); Piero A. Tozzi,
Whither Free Exercise: Employment Division v. Smith and the Rebirth of State Constitutional
Free Exercise Clause Jurisprudence?, 48 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 269, 276 (2009).
22. The term, “Culture Wars,” is borrowed from JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE
WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991), although the term is also used in
common parlance with the same meaning.
23. See infra Section III.B.3.
24. Laycock, supra note 10, at 868–70.
25. Id.; Corbin, supra note 5; NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 10.
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and religious entities, such as churches, synagogues, temples, and
mosques, are central to this article’s discussion of “traditional
religious entities.” 26 This Article argues that the shift in public
opinion has been aided by Hobby Lobby, and will ultimately work
against accommodating “traditional religious entities.”
The Hobby Lobby decision provides an example of why the shift in
public and political perception has occurred so rapidly. Religious
freedom claims by large corporate entities, whether closely held or
not, were not on the radar until recent years when a slew of them
were filed in response to the Affordable Care Act’s Health and
Human Services Mandate (HHS Mandate). 27 Ironically, traditional
religious entities such as churches were already exempted from the
HHS Mandate, 28 and affiliates of religious entities and religious nonprofits were also accommodated, 29 although that accommodation has
been challenged as inadequate to protect religious freedom. 30 When
for-profit corporations began to sue for exemptions to the mandate

26. See infra Section III.B.2 (discussing the meaning of “traditional religious entities”).
27. Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f)(2) (2012) (provision requiring
“minimal essential coverage”); 45 CFR § 147.131 (2015) (regulations promulgated by HHS
regarding the mandate). In addition to the Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Woods suits that gave
rise to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby, a number of other suits were filed by forprofit entities. See, e.g., Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850 (7th Cir. 2013); Korte v. Sebelius,
2012 WL 6757353 (7th Cir. 2012); O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 894 F.
Supp. 2d 1149 (E.D. Mo. 2012), rev’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 766 F.3d 862 (8th
Cir. 2014) (per curiam); Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106
(D.D.C. 2012); Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980 (E.D. Mich. 2012); Newland v.
Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Colo. 2012); see also Annex Med., Inc. v. Sebelius, No.
12-2804, 2013 WL 101927, at *3–4 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2013) (listing a number of unreported
opinions), order vacated in part, case remanded sub nom. Annex Med., Inc. v. Burwell, 769
F.3d 578 (8th Cir. 2014).
28. 45 CFR § 147.131(a).
29. 45 CFR §147.131(b). As discussed infra at Part IV, some religious organizations
were not satisfied with this accommodation.
30. Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422, 427 (3rd Cir.
2015); Mich. Catholic Conference v. Burwell, 755 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2014); Priests for Life v.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 235 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Wheaton Coll. v.
Sebelius, 703 F.3d 551 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Colo. Christian Univ. v. Sebelius, 51 F. Supp. 3d
1052 (D. Colo. 2014); Catholic Benefits Ass’n LCA v. Burwell, 81 F. Supp. 3d 1269 (W.D.
Okla. 2014); Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 988 F. Supp. 2d 912 (N.D. Ind. 2013).
Recently, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Little Sisters of the Poor Home
for the Aged v. Burwell, and consolidated it with six other cases. See Little Sisters of the Poor
Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 446
(Nov. 6, 2015) (No. 15-105).
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in order to limit contraceptive coverage, the resulting public outrage
was predictable in the midst of today’s culture wars. As recent events
in several states demonstrate, Hobby Lobby’s victory in the United
States Supreme Court has become part of the problem for those
advocating for religious freedom, not part of the solution. 31 In fact,
even before the Court issued its decision, the ACA litigation by forprofit entities led to widespread opposition to state religious
freedom measures. 32
One profound element affecting the public’s perception of
religious freedom is a misconception about what it means to be
religious. For some people, religion is something in which they
believe and are able to separate from other aspects of their lives, but
for others religion is lived every moment and in every context. 33 It is
a part of one’s being and cannot be artificially separated out when
one enters the public sphere. 34 Yet many people do not understand
this sort of “lived religion” and how generally applicable laws may
affect it; therefore, some view this sort of lived religion as
threatening when it enters public life. 35
Of course, just because one lives one’s religion does not mean
government has to facilitate one’s ability to do so in a way that
negatively affects others. Yet, today, this is precisely what many
people think RFRA is about. Rather than viewing RFRA as it was
viewed by many in 1993 36—a statute that could help protect Native
Americans who must chew peyote as part of their religious exercise,
Jews who need to have meat prepared in a certain way for it to be
Kosher, adult Jehovah’s Witnesses who cannot have blood
transfusions, etc.—many people today view RFRA 37 as a license for
landlords to discriminate based on sexual orientation or religion,
companies to discriminate in benefits by denying women important

31. See infra Part III.
32. See infra Section III.B.
33. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
34. Id.
35. Laycock, supra note 10; NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 10.
36. NUSSBAUM, supra note 12, at 160–61.
37. All references to RFRA in this article include federal and state RFRAs unless
otherwise noted. These references at the federal level, unless otherwise noted, also include
RLUIPA, which applies to land use issues. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012).
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treatments, and shops to discriminate in the provision of generally
available products and services, etc. 38
Until the Hobby Lobby litigation, this latter view was a
demonstrably skewed view of what RFRA had actually done. Yet,
after Hobby Lobby, the latter view seems more realistic and has gained
in political strength. This is evidenced by recent state battles over
RFRAs. Hobby Lobby gives opponents of religious freedom the best
ammunition yet to undermine it, and with good reason. It is now
possible that large, for-profit landlords may discriminate and use
RFRA (or RLUIPA, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act) to avoid liability, and that large, closely held companies
will be able to discriminate in the benefits they provide and avoid
liability. Those who argue such results are likely, however, often
minimize the fact that in many of these situations government will
succeed in demonstrating a compelling interest to prohibit the
conduct. Even so, Hobby Lobby makes such scenarios more likely
than before.
At the same time, another factor is likely to come into play to
weaken religious freedom in the wake of Hobby Lobby. Unfortunately,
it is often true that when the breadth of a constitutional right or civil
rights statute is expanded, the courts begin to interpret the
constitutional right or statute more narrowly. So breadth in coverage
often leads to less depth in protection. 39 This can be seen in a
number of civil rights and civil liberties contexts from Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 40 to the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), 41 to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as in the
constitutional context under the Free Speech Clause and under the
Free Exercise Clause itself. 42 Since RFRA is a civil liberties statute,
the Title VII, ADA, and § 1983 examples may be most apropos.

38. See infra Section III.B.
39. Cf. Philip Hamburger, More Is Less, 90 VA. L. REV. 835, 837–38 (2004) (addressing
this phenomenon under the First Amendment).
40. See Judith Olans Brown et al., Some Thoughts about Social Perception and
Employment Discrimination Law: A Modest Proposal for Reopening the Judicial Dialogue, 46
EMORY L.J. 1487 (1997).
41. See Frank S. Ravitch & Marsha B. Freeman, The Americans with “Certain”
Disabilities Act: Title I of the ADA and the Supreme Court’s Result Oriented Jurisprudence, 77
DENV. U. L. REV. 119 (1999).
42. Hamburger, supra note 39.
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For those of us who value religious freedom, this is not simply a
question of political trends and tactics. It is a question of what
religious freedom means in a pluralistic society when religious people
seek accommodation by government entities. What is it we are trying
to protect and who is it we are trying to protect? Religious
individuals, religious entities, entities affiliated with religious
institutions, or any entity run by religious people even if that entity
employs, markets to, and is engaged with the general public directly?
Would we rather have weaker religious protection for all of these
groups, as this Article argues will happen in the wake of Hobby
Lobby, 43 or would we rather have stronger protection for religious
individuals, religious entities, and affiliates of religious entities?
Part II of this Article provides an introduction to the Hobby
Lobby decision. Part III discusses why the expansion of free exercise
rights under RFRA to cover for-profit entities will lead to a
weakening of free exercise rights overall, and especially for what this
Article refers to as “traditional religious entities.” 44 There is
significant evidence that as rights are expanded to cover a broader
range of individuals or entities, courts frequently interpret those
rights in a narrower way. 45 This Part will address why this
phenomenon, seen clearly under civil rights statutes and the Free
Exercise Clause, 46 will also likely impact free exercise rights
under RFRA.
Part III will also address the legislative response to Hobby Lobby,
and demonstrate that not long after the decision, there is already
evidence that the free exercise rights of “traditional religious
entities” are suffering a negative impact in the wake of the Hobby
Lobby decision. This Part will also address the impact the Hobby Lobby
litigation, and related Affordable Care Act (ACA) litigation, have
had on public opinion regarding religious exemptions.
Part IV will set forth a detailed analysis of the weaknesses in the
Hobby Lobby decision. The Court makes a number of nuanced legal
arguments, but the decision fails to adequately address the most
significant precedent on whether for-profit entities should have free

43.
44.
45.
46.

See infra Part III.
See infra Section III.B.2.
See infra Section III.A.
Id.
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exercise rights, and if so, how those rights should be analyzed when
they have a negative impact on third parties. The Court also skews its
analysis of whether pre-Employment Division v. Smith cases under the
Free Exercise Clause should govern analysis under RFRA. 47

II. THE HOBBY LOBBY DECISION
Hobby Lobby is actually two cases that were consolidated by the
Supreme Court when granting the petitions for certiorari. 48 Both
cases involved challenges to the HHS Mandate by for-profit
corporations under the ACA, requiring employers to provide
contraceptive services as part of their health care coverage. 49 If the
corporations did not do so, hefty fines would be levied against
them. 50 The companies did not object to providing contraception
coverage generally, but rather to providing what they considered to
be abortifacients, including Plan B, Ella, and certain IUDs. 51
The first case involved a Pennsylvania corporation, Conestoga
Woods, which is closely held by the Hahn family and employs 950
people. Conestoga Woods sued to challenge the HHS Mandate. 52
The district court ruled against the company, 53 and the Third Circuit
held for-profit corporations are not protected by RFRA because they
cannot “engage in religious exercise . . . .” 54 The second case, and
the namesake of the Court’s decision, involved Hobby Lobby, a
large for-profit hobby and crafts chain incorporated under Oklahoma
law. 55 Hobby Lobby is owned by the Green family and has over 500
stores and 13,000 employees. 56 The Greens also own a chain of
Christian bookstores called Mardel that employs 400 people. 57 Both
companies sued to challenge the HHS mandate. 58 The district court

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

64

See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2767–69 (2014).
Id. at 2764–67.
Id.
Id. at 2762, 2766, 2775–76.
Id. at 2765–66.
Id. at 2764–65.
Id.
Id. at 2765.
Id. at 2765–66.
Id. at 2765.
Id.
Id. at 2766.
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held Hobby Lobby and Mardel were not likely to succeed on their
claims under the First Amendment or RFRA because the companies
could not meet the first two requirements for obtaining a
preliminary injunction. 59 The Tenth Circuit overturned that decision
and held that the companies were likely to succeed on their RFRA
claim under the first two requirements for a preliminary injunction
and remanded to the District Court to address the final two
requirements. 60 Both the Third and Tenth Circuits’ decisions were
appealed to the Supreme Court and the petitions for certiorari
were granted. 61
The fines for non-compliance with the HHS mandate are large. 62
Significantly, however, the HHS Mandate contains exemptions for
traditional religious entities such as churches, integrated auxiliaries of
churches, and associations of churches. 63 Moreover, it contains an
exception for other nonprofit, religiously affiliated entities, which
could cover entities such as charities and schools. 64 This exemption,
in effect, requires third-party coverage for contraceptive services to
which the nonprofit religious entity objects. 65 Additionally,
businesses with fewer than fifty employees are exempt from the
Affordable Care Act, 66 and thus the HHS Mandate. 67 Therefore, the
plaintiffs’ claims in the consolidated Hobby Lobby cases are only
applicable to for-profit entities with more than fifty employees.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2767.
62. Id. at 2762, 2766, 2775–76.
63. 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a) (2015) (“[A] ‘religious employer’ is an organization that is
organized and operates as a nonprofit entity and is referred to in section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or
(iii) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.”).
64. 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b).
65. 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b), (c). Some religious nonprofits do not find this
accommodation adequate to protect their religious freedom because they are still required to
act by certifying and signing that they are using the accommodation of third-party coverage,
which they believe would facilitate the harm they seek to avoid. Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y of Health
& Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2015); Priests for Life v. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Mich. Catholic Conference v. Burwell, 755 F.3d 372
(6th Cir. 2014); Wheaton Coll. v. Sebelius, 703 F.3d 551 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Catholic Benefits
Ass’n v. Burwell, No. CIV-14-685-R, 2014 WL 7399195 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 29, 2014); Colo.
Christian Univ. v. Sebelius, 51 F. Supp. 3d 1052 (D. Colo. 2014); Univ. of Notre Dame v.
Sebelius, 988 F. Supp. 2d 912 (N.D. Ind. 2013).
66. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2) (2012).
67. Id.

65

02.RAVITCH.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

8/4/2016 6:07 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2016

The Hobby Lobby case raises two key questions under RFRA.
First, are for-profit corporations covered under RFRA? Second, if so,
what happens when a for-profit corporation denies its employees a
benefit required under federal law because it has a religious objection
to providing that benefit? These same questions were raised under
the Free Exercise Clause, 68 but given that the HHS mandate is a law
of general applicability under Employment Division v. Smith, 69 the
Free Exercise Clause argument would only have traction if the court
had reversed or seriously limited Smith. It did not. 70 Therefore,
RFRA was the main focus of the Hobby Lobby decision.
The Court held that closely held for-profit corporations are
protected by RFRA. 71 Detailed criticism of this holding based on the
meaning of the “free exercise of religion” as understood by courts
prior to Hobby Lobby will be addressed later in this article. 72 This part
will address the bases for the Court’s holding more generally.
The Hobby Lobby Court explained that RFRA applies to for-profit
entities because there is no basis to exclude such entities from the
definition of “person” under RFRA. 73 RFRA specifically states that
persons are protected from substantial burdens on religion unless the
burden is supported by a compelling state interest and the law
creating the burden is narrowly tailored to meet that compelling
interest. 74 The Court correctly notes that cases decided under both
RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause have protected religious entities
and religious nonprofits, and thus it makes sense that such entities
are “persons” for purposes of RFRA protection. 75
From there, however, the Court’s analysis becomes more
strained. The Court suggests there is no practical difference between
protecting a religious entity or a religious nonprofit under RFRA
and protecting a closely-held for-profit corporation. 76 This breezes
past the fact that under pre-Smith law there is ample support for the

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

66

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2764–66 (2014).
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
See generally Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751.
Id. at 2768−75.
See infra Part IV.
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768−75.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012).
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768–69.
Id. at 2769.
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notion that for-profit entities were viewed differently from nonprofit
religious entities. 77 The Court avoids this concern in two ways.
First, it argues that because a Free Exercise challenge was allowed
to proceed in Braunfeld v. Brown, 78 a case involving Sunday closing
laws that had a negative impact on Orthodox Jewish businesses, forprofit businesses are covered by RFRA. 79 This argument is creative,
but weak. The dissent correctly points out that Braunfeld involved a
sole-proprietorship, and the burden on the entity and the individual
were treated by the Court as indivisible. 80 More importantly, the
dissent points out that the plaintiff—who suffered a significant
burden in that case—lost the free exercise claim. 81
It may be that the Hobby Lobby Court thought Braunfeld would
have won his claim under RFRA (or a state RFRA), if RFRA had
existed at that time, but the Court does not address this. Regardless,
the differences between the complainants in the Sunday closing cases
and the complainants in Hobby Lobby are stark given that the former
was a sole proprietorship and the latter are large corporations
employing many people.
The Braunfeld Court referenced the complainant in that case in
a manner that demonstrated the complainant’s personal rights were
the issue, and it never addressed the distinction between those
personal rights and the rights of the sole-proprietorship business the
complainant ran. 82 Interestingly, twenty years later in United States v.
Lee, the one case where the Court did mention the for-profit nature
of an employer, it found the for-profit business had to follow a
generally applicable law even if it burdened the owner’s religious
beliefs. 83 The Hobby Lobby Court attempts to distinguish Lee based
on the fact that it is a Free Exercise Clause case and that it involved
taxation, 84 but the relevant portion of Lee demonstrates the

77. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982).
78. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
79. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2769−70.
80. Id. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The majority did recognize this fact. Id. at
2770 (majority opinion).
81. Id. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
82. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 599.
83. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982).
84. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2784.
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discussion of for-profit entities is not so limited. 85 The Lee case is
discussed further in Part IV.
Second, the Court argues that RFRA, which when enacted
clearly applied pre-Smith law under the Free Exercise Clause, 86 is no
longer bound by that law in light of the legislative history of
RLUIPA. 87 This issue will be discussed in detail in Part IV, but the
crux of the argument is that Congress, by stating in RLUIPA that
both laws should be interpreted broadly and by deleting a reference
to the First Amendment, changed the meaning of RFRA and
detached it from pre-Smith law. 88 As explained in Part IV, this is not
what that amendment did. RFRA, as originally enacted, was to be
interpreted broadly and the removal of the reference to the First
Amendment in RLUIPA makes sense given that First Amendment
protection for religious freedom after Smith has been weak. 89 It has
nothing to do with whether pre-Smith law is relevant in
interpreting RFRA. 90
This is quite important to the Court’s analysis, however, because
if pre-Smith law does not govern, the Court can look to the
Dictionary Act to determine the meaning of the term “person.” 91
This is absolutely correct if pre-Smith law does not apply. If preSmith law does apply, however, the Dictionary Act does not apply on
its own terms because it has a provision stating the Act should be
applied when the context of the statute in question does not
“indicate[] otherwise.” 92 In other words, if the statute to which the
Dictionary Act is applied is connected to other law that helps define
its provisions, courts should look to that other law. As will be seen in

85. Lee, 455 U.S. at 261 (“When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial
activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of
conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding
on others in that activity. Granting an exemption from social security taxes to an employer
operates to impose the employer’s religious faith on the employees.”).
86. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424
(2006); Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2791−92 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Idleman, supra note 10
at 248–50.
87. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761−62.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2791−93 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 2768−69.
92. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
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Part IV, pre-Smith law does not support the Court’s holding that
closely held for-profit corporations are protected by RFRA.93
Therefore, the Court’s RLUIPA/Dictionary Act argument becomes
more important because it allows the Court to hold that pre-Smith
law does not bind interpretations of RFRA.
The next issue the Court addresses is whether the HHS mandate
imposes a “substantial burden” on the plaintiffs’ religion. 94 This is
one of the toughest questions in the case because it requires a
determination of whose religion is substantially burdened if we give
for-profit corporations free exercise rights under RFRA. Is it the
corporation? The owners? Some other group?
The Court held that in a closely held corporation the owners’
religious freedom is what should be considered. 95 It also held that
while corporations are creatures of state law they can have values and
expression as earlier decisions had recognized. 96 The Court rejected
the notion that the purpose of a corporation is just to make money. 97
It rejected the argument that religious values are inherently different
from other forms of corporate values, 98 and held that a closely held
corporation, at least, can exercise religion. 99 That exercise must be
viewed from the perspective of the owners of the closely held
corporation. 100 This holding, too, is controversial and will be
addressed further in Part IV.
Even if a closely held corporation can exercise religion, the
question remains whether the HHS Mandate serves a compelling
governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest. 101 The Court assumed arguendo that the HHS Mandate
met a compelling government interest by requiring that health plans

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See infra Part IV.
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775−79.
Id. at 2768−69.
Id. at 2771−72.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2768−74.
Id. at 2768−69.
Id. at 2779−82.
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include contraceptive coverage. 102 It found, however, that the HHS
Mandate was not narrowly tailored to meet that interest. 103
The Court noted that there are already several exceptions to the
HHS Mandate. 104 Ironically, two of these were to protect the
religious freedom of traditional religious entities like churches and
religious nonprofits. The former are completely exempt from the
HHS mandate, and the latter are not responsible to pay anything
towards contraceptive care to which they have religious objections.
Rather the entities’ insurance carrier, or a designated insurance
carrier if the entity is self-insured, would pay for the coverage. The
HHS mandate also has an exemption for employers with less than
fifty employees as is common for many federal statutes. 105 This
provision would, of course, protect small, closely held for-profit
entities whose owners have religious objections, but not based on
those objections. 106 Finally, the HHS Mandate has a grandfather
provision that allows companies to elect to keep their preexisting
plans under certain conditions. 107 This grandfather exemption was
designed to give companies time to adapt to the general
requirements of the broader statutory scheme and will be phased out
in the coming years. 108
The Court relied on these exemptions to suggest that the
government need not have uniformity of enforcement in order to
satisfy its compelling interest. Rather, government had already
created a system that could be used to protect its interest in universal
access to contraceptive care. 109 Namely, the government could do
what it already does for religious nonprofits by setting up a thirdparty payor system, or the government could pay for the care itself. 110
The Court held, therefore, that the burden on female employees

102. Id. at 2780.
103. Id. at 2781–85.
104. Id. at 2781–82.
105. See supra notes 64–67 and accompanying text.
106. The protection would be based on the size of the employer rather than any religious
objections. Id.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 18011(a), (e) (2012).
108. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 2781−82 (majority opinion).
110. Id. at 2780–81.
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would be “precisely zero.” 111 This, of course, ignores the fact that
other employers may object to contraceptives generally, or to other
medical treatments, and that the solution of the government payer,
whether politically feasible or not, can always be raised to show a less
restrictive alternative. 112 The idea that government could pay the way
when for-profit entities object to government mandates will likely
have a negative impact on religious freedom claims in the future.
This will be discussed further in Part III.
III. HOBBY LOBBY AND THE WEAKENING OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
FOR TRADITIONAL RELIGIOUS ENTITIES
Many advocates of religious freedom hailed the Hobby Lobby
decision as an important and welcomed victory. While I share their
support for religious freedom generally, my response to the Hobby
Lobby decision is quite different. Simply put, Hobby Lobby is a threat
to religious freedom.
Religious freedom was weakened immeasurably by the Smith
decision, and more recently has come under attack in public
discourse. 113 Both the courts and the public have been slow to
understand “lived religion,” the idea that for many religious people
religion is inseparable from other aspects of life and is lived daily, not
just at services on Saturday or Sunday. 114 Ironically, while the Hobby
Lobby decision recognizes this, it does so in a context where lived
religion is being asserted by a for-profit entity to the detriment of
employees who do not necessarily share the owners’
religious commitments. 115
This will not help the cause of protecting lived religion for
individuals and traditional religious entities. As this section explains,
it will undermine that religious freedom in the long run. There are
two reasons for this.
First, as rights have been applied to broader classes of people and
situations, the courts have often interpreted those rights more

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 2760.
Id. at 2802–03 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See infra Section III.B.3.
See supra note 3.
See generally Hobby Lobby, 143 S. Ct. at 2751.
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narrowly for everyone. 116 Second, we are already witnessing
significant backlash against the Hobby Lobby decision in battles over
state RFRAs and other state and federal legislation. 117 Moreover,
arguments that for-profit corporations should be protected by
RFRA, and the decision in Hobby Lobby confirming them, have
helped push religious freedom directly into the Culture Wars in a
way that it was not before these claims arose. 118 In fact, after the
Supreme Court decided Obergefell v. Hodges, recognizing a
constitutional right to same-sex marriage, 119 one of the major
concerns was that religious freedom claims would be used by forprofit entities, such as caterers and wedding companies, to deny
services or benefits. 120 There are also concerns over denials of service
by government officials such as county clerks, 121 and other entities
such as universities. 122
Both in public discourse and in legislative battles Hobby Lobby has
left a wake of destruction for religious freedom, and discourse about
religious freedom, and this trend is only beginning. RFRA was once
seen as a mechanism to protect religious minorities and other
religious people from state intrusion on their religious freedom, but
now RFRA is increasingly being characterized as a license for
religious entities to discriminate against and harm third parties.
116. Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 449, 479-80 (1985) (addressing this phenomenon under the First Amendment during
“pathological” periods, with a significant focus on free speech issues); Hamburger, supra note
39 (addressing this phenomenon under the First Amendment); Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom
of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980) (addressing this phenomenon in the context
of intimate associational freedoms).
117. See infra Section III.B.3.
118. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 10; see also Corbin, supra note 5 (written before the
Supreme Court decided Hobby Lobby, but noting the impact claims by for-profit entities could
have on the debate); cf. Laycock, supra note 10 at 848-51 (noting increasing tensions over
religious freedom issues).
119. Recently, the court decided Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
120. See, e.g., James M. Oleske, Jr., The Evolution of Accommodation: Comparing the
Unequal Treatment of Religious Objections to Interracial and Same-Sex Marriages, 50 HARV.
CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 99, 135−47 (2015) (addressing this concern just prior to the final
decision in Obergefell).
121. See, e.g., Frank S. Ravitch, Complementary or Competing Freedoms: Government
Officials, Religious Freedom and LGBTQ Rights, FLA. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2016).
122. David R. Wheeler, Gay Marriage and the Future of Evangelical Colleges, ATLANTIC
(July 14, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/07/evangelicalcolleges-struggle-gay-marriage-ruling/398306/.
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A. Broadening Rights Often Narrows their Depth
Philip Hamburger has explained that by expanding the substance
of Free Exercise rights, advocates of religious freedom have actually
narrowed the depth of those rights:
In this way, the conditions imposed [on Free Exercise] during the
last half of the twentieth century suggest how well-intentioned
efforts to enlarge a right can inflate it so far as to weaken it. It is a
strange legal trope, through which overstatement can have a cost.
More really can be less. 123

While I disagree with some of Hamburger’s specific applications
of the concept, his overall argument that courts often narrow rights
after those rights have been enlarged is well supported in a variety of
contexts. Other scholars have made the same point regarding
freedom of speech and freedom of intimate association. 124
Of course, the assertion made in this article is slightly different
because RFRA is a statute, not a constitutional provision, and the
expansion in this case is not of the right itself, but rather who is
protected by the right. Yet these two factors strengthen, rather than
weaken, the concern that Hobby Lobby will move religious freedom
backwards for individuals and traditional religious entities. Courts
deciding RFRA or state RFRA cases involving for-profit entities may
be more wary in applying those statutes, and in turn, can set
precedent for all claims under these statutes. Significantly, the
phenomenon of “more being less” that Hamburger mentions in the
Free Exercise context has been even more pronounced in the context
of civil rights statutes.
The most obvious examples are the treatment by courts of sexual
harassment, disparate treatment, disparate impact, and religious
exemption claims under Title VII; 125 claims for accommodation and
disparate treatment under the ADA; 126 and the application of 42

123. Hamburger, supra note 39, at 837–38.
124. Blasi, supra note 116 (addressing this phenomenon under the First Amendment
with a significant focus on free speech issues); Karst, supra note 116 (addressing this
phenomenon in the context of intimate associational freedoms).
125. Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Supreme Court Chipping Away at Title VII:
Strengthening It or Killing It?, 74 LA. L. REV. 1161 (2014).
126. Ravitch & Freeman, supra note 41.
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U.S.C. § 1983 generally. 127 Each of these laws were initially broadly
interpreted by courts, and were based on statutes intended to be
interpreted broadly; yet, each was ultimately interpreted more
narrowly—in some cases shockingly so—by the Supreme Court or
lower courts. There are many other examples, but the civil rights
examples are most similar to the RFRA context.
Moreover, both under civil rights statutes and the Constitution,
expansion of the individuals/entities protected has led to a
narrowing of rights. This can be seen clearly under the ADA and the
Free Speech Clause. 128 Of course, even without the latter examples,
the lesson of “more is sometimes less” applies naturally to both
substantive expansion of laws and expansion of those covered
by laws.
It is useful to explore some of these examples in further depth.
The next three sub-sections will do so. The first will explore the
growth and retrenchment of hostile work environment law under
Title VII. The second will explore accommodation under the ADA.
The third will explore an example from constitutional law, the Free
Exercise Clause itself.
1. Example one: hostile work environment sexual harassment
Hostile Work Environment as a form of workplace sexual
harassment was recognized by the Supreme Court at the federal level
in 1986. That case, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 129 recognized a
relatively broad right. The Court held that “Title VII is not limited
to ‘economic’ or ‘tangible’ discrimination,” 130 and is aimed “‘at the
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in
employment.’” 131 In doing so, the Court held that a claim for hostile
work environment could be established if unwelcome conduct in the
workplace based on gender was “severe or pervasive” enough to

127. Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move from Constitution to Tort, 77
GEO. L. J. 1719 (1989).
128. Blasi, supra note 116 (Free Speech Clause); Ravitch & Freeman, supra note
41 (ADA).
129. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
130. Id. at 64.
131. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
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create a “hostile or abusive work environment.” 132 This right was
quickly and appropriately expanded to apply to other groups
protected under Title VII, including race, religion, and
national origin.
Yet, two important questions remained regarding how one
determines what environments are severe or pervasive enough to
constitute a hostile work environment. First, what aspects of the
workplace are to be considered in determining whether
discrimination is severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work
environment? Second, from whose perspective must the environment
be hostile? The first question was far easier to answer than
the second.
The answer to the first question is that courts should look to the
totality of the circumstances to determine what constitutes a hostile
work environment. 133 The second question is more important,
however, because it determines from whose perspective the conduct
should be viewed. Should it be a reasonable person? A reasonable
woman? Or some other perspective? Ultimately, the Court adopted a
vague reasonable person standard. 134 In failing to specifically adopt a
reasonable woman standard (or reasonable member of the same
protected class standard) the Court ignored hints in earlier decisions
that the standard is a reasonable woman standard, 135 and this resulted
in significant scholarly criticism of the reasonable person standard. 136
This was an important setback to the breadth of the hostile work
environment cause of action, 137 but the retrenchment was far from
over. Lower courts seemed uncomfortable with the breadth of the

132. Id. at 66–67.
133. Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
134. Id. at 21.
135. Caroline Forell, Essentialism, Empathy and the Reasonable Woman, 1994 U. ILL. L.
REV. 769 (1994).
136. Id. at 783 (criticizing the “reasonable person” standard in hostile work environment
cases); Liesa L. Bernardin, Note, Does the Reasonable Woman Exist and Does She Have Any
Place in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claims Under Title VII After Harris, 46 FLA.
L. REV. 291, 321–22 (1994) (same); J. Tod Hyche, Comment, The Reasonable Woman
Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases. Is it Reasonable?, 24 CUMB. L. REV. 559, 567−68
(1994) (same).
137. Judith J. Johnson, License to Harass Women: Requiring Hostile Environment Sexual
Harassment to Be “Severe or Pervasive” Discriminates Among “Terms and Conditions” of
Employment, 62 MD. L. REV. 85 (2003).
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right even before the Supreme Court applied the reasonable person
standard. 138 After that, however, courts had an easy tool to find no
hostile work environment existed by finding conduct that many
women might find severe or pervasive to not be so under the
reasonable person standard. 139 This trend has been significant as the
originally broad protection against hostile work environments has
become weaker, with fewer plaintiffs winning. 140 The right was born,
expanded, and then after its expansion severely restricted. 141 This is
just one of many such examples under Title VII, including religious
accommodation, disparate treatment, and disparate impact.
2. Example two: reasonable accommodation under the ADA
There are numerous examples of the Supreme Court or lower
courts limiting protection under the ADA despite the fact the law
specifically states it is to be construed broadly. 142 Most of these cases
involve
claims
by
disabled
individuals
for
reasonable
143
accommodation. The judicial rollback of the ADA seems to be
heavily motivated by the fact that the Act was designed to cover a
broad range of people. 144
Two of the most notorious examples of this phenomenon can be
seen in the Supreme Court’s decisions in Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 145 and Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc. 146 Congress
ultimately overturned these decisions in an amendment to the ADA,
but the holdings in these cases are a prime example of courts
narrowly interpreting a law because of the breadth of that law. These
cases addressed whether the definition of an “individual with a

138. Sarah E. Burns, Evidence of a Sexually Hostile Workplace: What Is It and How Should
It Be Assessed After Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.?, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
357 (1994).
139. Johnson, supra note 137.
140. Id. at 111−34.
141. Id. at 85.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012) (explaining, in the purpose and findings sections, that
one of the goals of the ADA is “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities”).
143. Ravitch & Freeman, supra note 126.
144. Id. at 144–47.
145. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
146. 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
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disability” should be determined based on the individual’s
unmitigated condition (that is, the condition without regard to
medication or prosthetics) or the individual’s mitigated condition.147
This question is especially important because if the determination is
made based on the mitigated condition, many individuals with
disabilities will not be covered by the ADA. Therefore, these
individuals would be unable to request accommodation for
disabilities even where failure to accommodate would exacerbate the
disability to the point that the disability is no longer mitigated
by medication. 148
Prior to the Court’s decisions in Sutton and Murphy, the answer
seemed clear. 149 Mitigating measures such as medications and
prosthetics were not to be considered in determining whether
someone is disabled for ADA purposes. 150 In fact, all three agencies
charged with implementing the ADA, and most of the courts that
had addressed the issue, considered this threshold question a
straightforward one. 151 This view was supported by substantial
legislative history. 152
The Court disregarded all of this, and held over strong dissents
in both cases that the plain meaning of the law required mitigating
measures to be considered in disability determinations. 153 This was a
huge rollback of ADA protection, but it is only one of many
examples. The Court’s decisions in these cases effectively precluded
many individuals with disabilities from getting accommodations
under the ADA if their disabilities are controlled by mitigating
measures such as medications, unless they can show that they are
“regarded as disabled” under the ADA, an argument that the Court
also substantially limited. 154 Ironically, as a result of these individuals
not being considered disabled, employers could plausibly
discriminate against them based on their impairments without

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Ravitch & Freeman, supra note 41.
Id. at 121–22, 137–50.
Id. at 137–45.
Id. at 142–47.
Id. at 122–23.
Id. at 146–47.
Id. at 124–33.
Id. at 147–50.
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running afoul of the ADA. 155 These decisions seem odd given that
Title I of the ADA is to be interpreted broadly to prevent
employment discrimination based on unfounded stereotypes of
disabilities and disabled individuals. 156 By removing individuals from
the ADA’s coverage in answering the threshold question of whether
they are disabled, the Court denies them ADA protection entirely,
thus denying them the opportunity to receive accommodation and
even to obtain redress when they are victims of intentional
discrimination based on their condition. 157 Even if an
accommodation would help avoid problems related to the condition,
if those problems have not yet occurred and the individual is
otherwise well controlled by medication, prosthetics, etc., that
individual is not disabled under the Court’s analysis, and thus cannot
get to the issue of reasonable accommodation under the Act. 158 And,
as the Court also made it less likely that such individuals will meet
the “regarded as” having a disability standard, even an employer’s
use of broad-based stereotypes may not be availing to such
individuals. 159 This effectively removes many employees with
disabilities from coverage under the ADA, and may actually protect
employers who discriminate based on unfounded stereotypes,
misconceptions, or outright animus. 160
Simply put, courts know how to contract statutory protections—
even against the weight of the rules of statutory interpretation—
when they view the statute as too broad. While the ADA was initially
interpreted to cover more individuals, both the substance of that
protection and the protection itself, even for those obviously
intended to be protected under the Act, was significantly limited.
Luckily, Congress fixed the situation by amending the ADA. Of
course, And unlike religious freedom the ADA was not smack in the
middle of the Culture Wars.

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
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Id. at 150.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, 12102(4)(A) (2012).
Ravitch & Freeman, supra note 41.
Id. at 121–33.
Id. at 147–50.
Id. at 150.
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3. Example three: the free exercise clause
The history of claims for exemptions to generally applicable laws
under the Free Exercise Clause is full of twists and turns, but in the
end it demonstrates that as rights became more broadly recognized a
retrenchment occurred, turning the promise of more religious
freedom into a tale of less religious freedom.161 The United States
Supreme Court’s initial struggles with the issue led to the
development of a dichotomy between belief and practice. 162 Reynolds v.
United States 163 is generally considered a major early precedent for this
dichotomy. Essentially, the dichotomy suggests that belief must be
protected in order to have religious freedom, but behavior or practice
may be regulated (under generally applicable laws in the modern
version) for the good of society. 164 This dichotomy was altered in the
landmark case of Sherbert v. Verner,165 and in turn this was undermined
by the Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith. 166
As I have explained elsewhere, this account of the evolution of
free exercise rights and their subsequent destruction in Smith is
flawed. 167 Sadly, the Free Exercise rights set forth in Sherbert were on
the decline within fifteen years as the Court began to chip away at
the broad protection recognized in Sherbert. 168 Also of note is the
fact that religious minorities (especially non-Christian religious
minorities) did not reap great benefits from Sherbert. 169

161. Hamburger, supra note 39, at 837–38; Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise
Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1120–21 (1990).
162. Frank S. Ravitch, Rights and the Religion Clauses, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 91, 97–103 (2008).
163. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
164. See generally Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of the State of Or. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990); Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 161−67. There is, however, a strong argument that the
law at issue in Reynolds was designed as a mechanism to discriminate against an unpopular
religious minority. See Keith E. Sealing, Polygamists Out of the Closet: Statutory and State
Constitutional Prohibitions Against Polygamy Are Unconstitutional Under the Free Exercise
Clause, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 691 (2001).
165. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
166. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
167. FRANK S. RAVITCH, MASTERS OF ILLUSION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
RELIGION CLAUSES (2007).
168. Id.
169. STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE DON’T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS: A
CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 218–54 (1997).
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In Sherbert v. Verner, the Court abandoned the belief/practice
dichotomy and held that a state must have a compelling
governmental interest for denying a religious exemption when a
generally applicable law substantially burdens someone’s religion. 170
In that case, the plaintiff was denied unemployment benefits after
being fired for refusing to work on her Sabbath. 171 The Court held
that the state did not have a compelling interest for denying the
benefits, and, in fact, noted that the state unemployment laws
contained a number of exemptions including one for Sunday
Sabbatarians. 172 Sherbert was a broad recognition of rights under the
Free Exercise Clause. Earlier cases had been a mixed bag;173
although, as Philip Hamburger explains, the application of any test,
including the compelling interest test, may narrow free exercise more
than originally intended by the framers of the Free
Exercise Clause. 174
After Sherbert, it remained to be seen how the Court would greet
this broad reading of the Free Exercise Clause in subsequent cases.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court held that Amish families with highschool age children were entitled to exemptions from the state’s
compulsory education laws in the absence of a compelling state
interest and narrow tailoring. 175 The court looked at the Amish
community’s track record of good citizenship, hard work, and the
success of its young people within the community to demonstrate
that the state had no compelling interest for denying
the exemption. 176
Following Yoder, however, the Court decided a string of Free
Exercise exemption cases in which the plaintiffs almost always lost,

170. 374 U.S. at 406–09.
171. Id. at 399–401.
172. Id. at 406; see also Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 50 (“The other point in the Court’s explanation of its unemployment compensation
cases is secular exemptions. If the state grants exemptions from its law for secular reasons, then
it must grant comparable exemptions for religious reasons. . . . In general, the allowance of any
exemption is substantial evidence that religious exemptions would not threaten the
statutory scheme.”).
173. RAVITCH, supra note 167.
174. Hamburger, supra note 39.
175. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234–36 (1972).
176. Id. at 209–12, 216–18, 222–27, 235–36.
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and in which non-Christian plaintiffs always lost. 177 With the
exception of a few unemployment cases, 178 the compelling interest
test was turned into a paper tiger. In some cases the nature of the
government institution (i.e., the military or prisons) 179 served as a
basis for not applying the compelling interest test. 180 In others, the
relief requested was decisive in not applying the compelling interest
test: 181 for example, cases where the government entity involved
would have had to change its policies to grant an exemption. 182
Finally, there were cases where the court ostensibly applied the
compelling interest test, but in a manner that made it anything but
strict scrutiny. 183 It should be noted, however, that Sherbert and
Yoder did influence the outcomes of some lower court cases. 184

177. FELDMAN, supra note 169.
178. In fact, no non-Christian has ever won a Free Exercise Clause exemption case before
the United States Supreme Court and even most Christians have lost such cases. Mark
Tushnet, “Of Church and State and the Supreme Court”: Kurland Revisited, 1989 SUP. CT.
REV. 373, 381 (1989).
179. See, e.g., O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (prison setting);
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (military setting).
180. See, e.g., Frazee v. Ill. Dept. of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
181. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
182. Id.
183. E.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
184. Lower court cases went both ways after Sherbert and Yoder, and while many denied
the claimant’s exemptions, a number did not. See, e.g., Dayton Christian Schs., Inc. v. Ohio
Civil Rights Comm’n, 766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1985) (school’s free exercise rights violated by
application of civil rights laws); McCurry v. Tesch, 738 F.2d 271 (8th Cir. 1984) (enforcement
of state order against operation of church school in violation of state law infringed church’s
free exercise rights); Warner v. Graham, 675 F. Supp. 1171 (D.N.D. 1987) (Free Exercise
Clause violated where plaintiff lost her job because of sacramental peyote use); United States v.
Lewis, 638 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (rule requiring government to consent to waiver
of a jury trial violated defendants’ free exercise rights); United States v. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp.
1301 (D.N.M. 1986) (Bald Eagle Protection Act violated defendant’s free exercise rights);
Congregation Beth Yitzchok of Rockland, Inc. v. Town of Ramapo, 593 F. Supp. 655
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (regulations interfering with congregation’s operation of its nursery school
violated free exercise rights); Chapman v. Pickett, 491 F. Supp. 967 (C.D. Ill. 1980) (free
exercise rights of Black Muslim prisoner were violated by his punishment for refusal to follow
order to handle pork); Geller v. Sec’y of Def., 423 F. Supp. 16 (D.D.C. 1976) (regulation
denying Jewish chaplain right to wear facial hair violated his free exercise rights); Lincoln v.
True, 408 F. Supp. 22 (W.D. Ky. 1975) (denial of unemployment compensation to claimant
who terminated employment for religious reasons infringed her free exercise rights); Am.
Friends Serv. Comm. v. United States, 368 F. Supp. 1176 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (tax withholding
statute violates plaintiffs’ free exercise rights); Nicholson v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 338 F. Supp. 48
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In Employment Division v. Smith, Native American employees of
a drug rehabilitation center were fired, and subsequently denied
unemployment benefits because they used peyote at a ritual
service. 185 There was no evidence that these employees used peyote at
any time other than the ritual services; 186 in fact, their religion
forbade use outside of ritual ceremonies. 187 They sued under the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution to receive unemployment benefits. 188 In an opinion
written by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court explicitly restored the
belief/practice dichotomy, 189 and held that the state need not create
exemptions to laws of general applicability to accommodate religious
practices. 190 The opinion noted that states remained free to create
exemptions to laws that have an adverse impact on
religious practices. 191
The facts of the case are well documented. 192 As noted above,
two members of the Native American Church were denied
unemployment benefits after being fired from their jobs at a
substance abuse rehabilitation center. 193 The employees were fired
because they had chewed peyote, an illegal substance under Oregon
law, during religious rituals. 194 Oregon law stated that being fired for
misconduct—which is how the firing was characterized—precludes
the receipt of unemployment benefits. 195 Neither individual abused
peyote and there was no evidence that either had used peyote

(N.D. Ala. 1972) (statutory oath required of applicant for admission to state bar infringed on
applicant’s free exercise rights).
185. 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
186. See Respondents’ Brief at 1–5, Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of the State of Or.
v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988) (Nos. 86-946, 86-947), 1987 WL 880316.
187. GARRETT EPPS, TO AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL
60−62 (2001).
188. Smith, 494 U.S. at 875.
189. Id. at 879.
190. Id. at 879–80.
191. Id. at 890.
192. See EPPS, supra note 187 (providing detailed discussion of the factual background
leading to the Smith case).
193. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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anywhere other than in religious ceremonies. 196 In fact, it would
violate the tenets of the Native American Church to use peyote
outside of appropriate religious rituals because the substance has
significant religious import for members of the faith. 197 Oregon,
unlike many states and the federal government, 198 did not have a
religious exemption for Native American peyote use under its general
drug laws. 199
Thus, the Court had to decide whether the two men denied
unemployment benefits had a constitutional right to an exemption
to the drug laws given the religious nature of their peyote use. 200 An
exemption would have precluded the denial of unemployment
benefits based on ritual peyote use. 201 Interestingly, the attorney
general for the state of Oregon never argued that the compelling
interest test should be disregarded, 202 but rather he argued that
compliance with the state’s drug laws satisfied the burden under that
test, especially in light of post-Sherbert and Yoder case law. 203
The Smith Court nonetheless held that there is no duty to
provide exemptions to a generally applicable law. 204 The compelling
interest test set forth in Sherbert was limited to the unemployment
context where there are generally a variety of exemptions built into

196. See Respondents’ Brief, supra note 186, at 1–5, 17; Garrett Epps, To an Unknown
God: The Hidden History of Employment Division v. Smith, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 962–63,
981–85 (1998).
197. Garrett Epps, What We Talk About When We Talk About Free Exercise, 30 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 563, 583 (1998) (“An uncontroverted part of the record was the relentless opposition by
the peyote religion to the use of peyote outside the ritual context, and to the use of other
drugs and alcohol for any reason whatsoever.” (citation omitted)); see also Smith, 494 U.S. at
872, 913–16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
198. Smith, 494 U.S. at 912 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
199. See generally id. at 876 (majority opinion).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 875–76.
202. See Brief for Petitioners at 8–10, Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of the State of
Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (No. 88-1213), 1989 WL 1126846; Epps, supra note 196,
at 1010–15. This was also confirmed in a conversation I had with former Oregon Attorney
General David Frohnmayer in Kyoto, Japan in 2001, when we both spoke at a forum
addressing the free exercise of religion at Doshisha University (Frohnmayer was speaking as the
President of the University of Oregon and I was a Fulbright Scholar at the Faculty of Law at
Doshisha University).
203. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 202.
204. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884–85.
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the unemployment laws. 205 Furthermore, the Court held that the
claim in Smith was different from earlier Free Exercise cases granting
exemptions to unemployment laws because the claimants in Smith
sought an exemption based on illegal conduct while the claimants in
the earlier cases sought an exemption based on religious conduct
that was otherwise legal. 206
Yoder was harder to distinguish, but the Court created the
concept of “hybrid rights”—and I stress the word “created”—
because the concept makes no legal sense as explained below.
“Hybrid rights” cases are cases in which the Free Exercise Clause
right is connected to some other important right (in Yoder parental
rights). 207 This concept was used to distinguish several earlier cases
that involved freedom of expression as well as free exercise
concerns, 208 and to distinguish Yoder. Yet, to characterize Yoder as a
hybrid rights case is patently disingenuous. 209
Divorcing Smith from all the important baggage regarding stare
decisis, etc., we are left with the basic notion that the Free Exercise
Clause does not require exemptions to generally applicable laws. The
argument seems to be that because these laws are religion neutral the

205. Id at 883–84.
206. Id. at 874–75, 878.
207. Id. at 881–82.
208. Id.
209. Moreover, the concept of “hybrid rights” makes no sense whatsoever. Is the Court
saying that two inadequate constitutional rights combined can make an adequate one? If so, it
would not be hard to hybridize almost anything into a viable constitutional right. Or are
hybrid rights the combination of two adequate constitutional rights? This possibility is
precluded by the Smith Court’s reasoning because clearly the Free Exercise Clause right would
be inadequate by itself in an exemption case under the Smith Court’s reasoning. This leaves
two possibilities. First, the other constitutional right in the hybrid rights context would be
adequate on its own and the Free Exercise Clause right is not, in which case why mention the
Free Exercise Clause in exemption cases because it essentially serves no function other than
being an anti-discrimination principle. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). Of course, such an antidiscrimination principle could be
covered under the Equal Protection Clause and perhaps the Establishment Clause, which raises
the question of whether the Free Exercise Clause serves any function under the Smith Court’s
reasoning other than in unemployment cases. Maxine Eichner, Who Should Control Children’s
Education?: Parents, Children, and the State, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1339, 1384–85 (2007); Ira
C. Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith and the Decline of Supreme Court-Centrism, 1993
BYU L. REV. 259, 267 (1993); McConnell, supra note 161. Second, and apparently accurate,
hybrid rights are just a judicial creation to get around inconvenient precedent. The last
possibility seems to be the obvious answer. McConnell, supra note 161.
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Free Exercise Clause has no impact on them except through the
political process. 210 This, of course, begs the question of whether
such laws can ever be neutral given the vast array of religions and
huge amount of government activity in the United States. 211 The
history of Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, especially in the latter
part of the Twentieth Century, is a staggering example of the moreis-less phenomenon. 212
RFRA was passed in response to Smith. 213 It was an attempt to
roll back the Court’s retrenchment on free exercise rights and return
the law to where it was pre-Smith, with a particular emphasis on
Sherbert and Yoder. 214 When the Court limited RFRAs reach, by
holding that Congress overstepped its enumerated powers by
imposing RFRA on the states, 215 states reacted by passing their own
RFRAs. 216 Congress followed up by passing the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act, which applies a similar standard as
that under RFRA to cases involving prisons or land use. 217
At the time these laws were passed, religious freedom was mostly
viewed as beneficial because it protected religious individuals and
entities from government actions that substantially burdened their
practice. As the support for RFRA when it was passed demonstrates,
most on both sides in the culture wars initially viewed RFRA as
protecting important freedoms. 218 This perception has changed
dramatically. The next section addresses how Hobby Lobby may be the
beginning of the end for religious freedom due to public opposition
to the outcome and the fuel it adds to the arguments in opposition
to religious accommodations more generally. It shows we are coming
full circle and suggests that over time the shift in public opinion
could affect how courts view religious freedom claims.
210. See generally Smith, 494 U.S. at 872.
211. RAVITCH, supra note 167.
212. Hamburger, supra note 39.
213. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2012); Mark L. Rienzi, Unequal Treatment of Religious
Exercises Under RFRA: Explaining the Outliers in the HHS Mandate Cases, 99 VA. L. REV.
ONLINE 10, 12–13 (2013).
214. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1); Rienzi, supra note 213.
215. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1996).
216. Laycock, supra note 10, at 845 (providing number of state RFRAs as of 2014).
217. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012).
218. Idleman, supra note 10; Laycock, supra note 10, at 845–46 (noting that religious
accommodations and RFRA have “become far more controversial than [they] used to be”).

85

02.RAVITCH.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/4/2016 6:07 PM

2016

B. The Culture Wars and Shifting Perceptions of Religious Freedom
When RFRA was passed it enjoyed widespread public support
and bipartisan political support. 219 For religious people, RFRA was
necessary to protect religious practice from intentional or
unintentional government interference. For civil libertarians and
other members of the public, RFRA was a way to protect people
who—even if their religious views seemed odd or out of date—were
still deserving of the freedom to practice their religion so long as that
freedom is balanced appropriately against public interests. 220
Recently, this calculus has changed for many. A big factor in this
change is the assertion by some religious individuals and entities that
their religious freedom includes the right to violate the rights of
others. 221 The most salient examples of this are cases where
landlords—and now under Hobby Lobby this could include large
corporate landlords that are closely held—discriminate against LGBT
individuals in renting properties; 222 where churches and other
religious entities attempted, with occasional success, to avoid liability
for clergy abuse based on the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine, 223

219. Idleman, supra note 10; Laycock, supra note 10, at 845–46.
220. See Idleman supra note 10, at 248–49.
221. Corbin, supra note 5, at 1481–82; NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 10.
222. Emily Badger, Look How Many States Still Allow Housing Discrimination Against
Gays, ATLANTIC: CITYLAB (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.citylab.com/housing/2013/04/
states-where-its-still-legal-discriminate-against-gays-single-women-and-poor-housing/5273.
223. See, e.g., Ehrens v. Lutheran Church-Mo. Synod, 269 F. Supp. 2d 328, 333
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that negligent supervision and retention claim against church for
retaining pastor who allegedly sexually abused plaintiff when he was a minor was barred by
First Amendment, and would necessarily involve impermissible analysis for the standards and
rules “as to the duty of care by which a denomination keeps its ‘roster’ of those priests . . .
authorized to accept canonical employment”); Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 898 F.
Supp 1169 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (holding that Church employees who brought claim for
professional malpractice against minister who began sexual relationships during marriage
counseling could not bring action against Church for negligent supervision when marriage
counseling was not one of the minister’s duties); Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp.
1138 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (federal court sitting in diversity not convinced that Wisconsin
would, at the time, adopt yet unrecognized independent cause of action for negligent
supervision); Napieralski v. Unity Church of Greater Portland, 802 A.2d 391 (Me. 2002)
(deciding a negligent supervision claim against minister who sexually assaulted woman in his
own home during private personal visit unrelated to Church business or function, despite the
fact that the Church owned the home, dismissed due to Maine not recognizing negligent
supervision cause of action); Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 692 A.2d 441,
444–45 (Me. 1997) (holding that “[p]astoral supervision is an ecclesiastical prerogative” and it
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which is grounded, at least in part, on free exercise concerns; 224
where government officials refuse to perform their designated
functions based on religious objections to those seeking their help; 225
and where for-profit entities, such as Hobby Lobby, seek to deny
benefits to employees based on religious objections. 226
Anybody who deals regularly with religious freedom claims
understands that these are a tiny minority of cases. Most claims for
religious accommodation have no significant effects on anyone other

would be improper to impose secular supervision standards on a church); Teadt v. Lutheran
Church Mo. Synod, 603 N.W.2d 816 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that negligent
supervision claim was not independently actionable without first establishing wrongdoing by
the Church employee; without an actionable claim that the minister had violated some duty in
beginning sexual relationship, the parishioner could not establish that the Church had been
negligent in supervising him); Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 21 P.3d
198 (Utah 2001) (holding that claim against church for negligence stemming from counseling
and referral to unlicensed counselor would be a clergy malpractice claim barred by the First
Amendment); Shull v. Caroline Furnace Lutheran Camp and Retreat Ctr., 64 Va. Cir. 472
(2004) (holding a church camp not liable for negligence stemming from child who drowned at
camp due to charitable immunity); S.H.C. v. Lu, 54 P.3d 174 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (holding
that negligent supervision claim against Buddhist temple would necessarily involve questions of
how obedient the Temple should have been to the defendant Grandmaster and thus involve
impermissible religious entanglement).
224. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct.
694 (2012).
225. Ravitch, supra note 121 (discussing this issue in depth and suggesting that
government officials can be accommodated so long as someone else with authority is available
to serve the people seeking help without delay or reduction in service). For some specific
examples, see Miller v. Davis, No. 15-44-DLB, 2015 WL 4866729 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 12, 2015);
Robicheaux v. Caldwell, Nos. 13-5090, 14-97 & 14-327, 2015 WL 4090353 (E.D. La. Jul. 2,
2015); Strawser v. Strange, 105 F. Supp. 3d 1323 (S.D. Ala. 2015) (order granting plaintiffs’
motion for preliminary injunction); Valerie Howell, Kentucky Clerk Continues to Refuse to Issue
Same-Sex Marriage Licenses Despite Court Ruling, JURIST (Aug. 28, 2015),
http://jurist.org/paperchase/2015/08/kentucky-clerk-continues-to-refuse-to-issue-samesex-marriage-licenses-despite-court-rulings.php (discussing the case of a Kentucky county clerk
who lost her claim to deny same-sex marriage licenses in Federal District Court and had her
request for a stay of that judgment denied by the Sixth Circuit pending disposition of the
appeal, yet still refuses to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples); Zoë Schlanger, Florida
County Clerks Go Rogue, Refuse to Marry Anyone to Avoid Same-Sex Weddings, NEWSWEEK
(Jan. 2, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/florida-county-courts-go-rogue-refuse-marryanyone-avoid-same-sex-weddings-296300.
226. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2551 (2014); Alan E. Garfield,
The Contraception Mandate Debate: Achieving a Sensible Balance, 114 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 1 (2014).
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than the religious individual(s) or entity, 227 involve no discrimination
against others, 228 and are designed to remedy the failure of legislative
bodies to recognize the impact laws may have on religious people
whose backgrounds and traditions are not well understood by the
majority. 229 Claims for exemptions to school policies requiring
students to take tests or attend class on holy days, claims for access to
Kosher or Halal food in government-run facilities such as prisons,
claims by Muslims, Jews, Sikhs, and others to be able to cover their
heads in places where the law generally requires the removal of head
coverings, claims by adults to refuse certain medical treatments that
they believe threaten their eternal being, claims by Native Americans
to be able to follow rituals regardless of contrary government
regulation, claims by churches to not be bound by laws that
fundamentally impact their religious values—these are the bread and
butter of religious freedom claims.
Every landlord who seeks to discriminate against members of the
LGBT community and every for-profit company that seeks to deny
its employees benefits based on religion—especially when those
employees are not co-religionists—attracts media attention and
weakens public support for religious freedom, even if the claimants
do so based on deeply held religious beliefs. 230 This mostly hurts the
bread and butter claims mentioned above.
Recent debates over state RFRAs and other laws show this in
painstaking detail. RFRAs have become, in the public’s mind, statutes
granting companies a right to discriminate and avoid the law based on
religious objections, rather than statutes protecting the faithful who
need protection. 231 The less the public views RFRA as being about
protecting the rights of religious people, and the more it views RFRA
as being a license for those making money to harm third parties, the

227. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015); Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente
Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
228. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 853; Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 418; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205;
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398.
229. See, e.g., Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 853; Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 418; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205;
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398.
230. See infra Section III.B.3.
231. Id.
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greater the risks to religious freedom for those traditionally protected
by RFRA—religious individuals and entities—will be.
Many of my fellow advocates for strong religious freedom
protection will point out that these lines are artificial and miss the
point about lived faith. For people of faith like the Greens and the
Hahns, there is no artificial line between the different aspects of their
life and their religion. 232 If they were made to cover the
contraceptives they objected too, they would be complicit in evil that
violates the most fundamental nature of their beliefs. 233 These are
powerful arguments that will be addressed in greater detail below,
and they are arguments with which I sympathize to a point, 234 but
they are irrelevant to the dynamic I am addressing; a dynamic based
in cold, hard, and pragmatic reality.
At this point warriors on both sides of the Culture Wars are
taking no prisoners, and the reality is that perception matters if
religious freedom for traditional religious entities is to remain
strong. 235 While detailed debates about the nature of facilitating evil
and accommodating religion are important to me and to those
concerned with religious freedom questions as matters of the
boundary between lived religion and society generally, these issues
become irrelevant outside of theological and academic discourse if
the Federal RFRA or state RFRAs are repealed, if state RFRAs are
opposed by the public and are not passed when proposed, if RFRA
becomes ridden with holes of legislative or judicial creation, or if
other legislation is passed that prevents even individuals and religious
entities from gaining exemptions to laws of general applicability. All
of these things have happened, or have been proposed, since the
Hobby Lobby litigation began, and especially since Hobby Lobby was
decided. 236 Hobby Lobby may very well be a case of winning the battle,

232. See supra note 3.
233. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2764–66, 2775 (2014).
234. For me, that point ends when a large for-profit entity, whether closely held or not,
that through the corporate form protects its owners from legal liability and receives numerous
tax breaks subsidized by the public, claims it need not provide benefits to its employees that
the government requires it to provide. I am far more amenable to claims by religious entities
and non-profits that they should not be required to facilitate evil; although where that line
should be drawn under the ACA given its accommodation of these entities is unclear.
235. Laycock, supra note 10, at 869–77, 879–80.
236. See infra Section III.B.3.
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but losing the war. The following three subsections will address the
Culture Wars, “traditional religious entities,” and the legal and
public response to Hobby Lobby, respectively.
1. The culture wars
The term “Culture Wars” came into common use after James
Davison Hunter’s seminal book, Culture Wars: The Struggle to
Define America, was published in 1992. 237 Hunter wrote about the
struggles between social conservatives and progressives, and those
who align themselves on issues with one side or the other, to define
American values. 238 Others have argued with some force that many
Americans seek a middle ground and that the Culture Wars are issue
specific or more salient at the political fringes. 239 However, in the
context of religious freedom, availability of contraceptives, civil rights
and civil liberties issues involving the LGBT community, lived
religion, and government support for religion, the Culture Wars are
quite real. 240 In light of the United States Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 241 and the response by opponents of
same-sex marriage, the Culture Wars have reached a fevered pitch. In
fact, Hunter’s book, though written more than twenty years ago,
seems especially relevant today.
In order to understand the negative impact Hobby Lobby has had,
and will continue to have, on religious freedom for traditional
religious entities, it is helpful to look at the battle lines drawn by
culture warriors on both sides in the wake of Hobby Lobby.
Specifically, it is important to look at the battle over what it means to
be a religious person in a pluralistic society and the importance of
contraceptive coverage for women’s health. Obviously, these are the
two issues at the heart of Hobby Lobby and the strong public backlash
that has occurred since the Court decided that case. 242

237. HUNTER, supra note 22.
238. Id.
239. MORRIS P. FIORINA, CULTURE WAR? THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA (3d
ed. 2011).
240. Laycock supra note 10; NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 10.
241. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
242. See infra Section III.B.3.
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As mentioned above, many religious people cannot separate their
lives into neat sections; some sections involving religion and other
sections not. The notion that religion is a private thing that can be
separated from other aspects of life is inconsistent with the way many
people experience religion. 243 For many, religion is not something
that can be tossed aside to make life easier or to fit in. It is at the
core of one’s being. 244
Therefore, religion is with us when we wake up, when we go to
sleep, and every minute in between, whether consciously or not. It
effects how we deal with others, how we view the world, and in
some cases what we eat or what we wear. Those of us whose religions
might be viewed as progressive can identify with both sides in the
Culture Wars. We support gay marriage and LGBT rights, believe
that science and religion need not conflict, support women’s
reproductive rights, and so forth. Yet, much of this comes from
religious, as well as social, commitments and therefore we
understand deeply the concerns of those whose faith seems to be
under assault by modernity and progressive values.
For many in this latter group, their most deeply held views on
faith, the family, the place of humanity in the world and the universe,
eternal life, and more are under daily assault. 245 For these people the
Culture Wars are not about tolerance or intolerance, they are about
values that are at the core of what it means for them to be human
and to honor G-d. 246 You and I may disagree with their values at a
political level, but it is naive and intolerant to assume that they
should have to give up their most central beliefs because we don’t
like those beliefs. 247 Robust religious freedom (and, for that matter,
freedom of expression) must protect everyone, not just those whose
faith is consistent with the current political climate. This is what civil
liberties are supposed to do under U.S. law.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

See supra note 3.
Id.
HUNTER, supra note 22 and accompanying text.
Id.; Laycock, supra note 10; NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 10.
FRANK S. RAVITCH, FREEDOM’S EDGE: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, SEXUAL FREEDOM,
AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at chs. 1–2) (on file with
author) (arguing that trying to force religious people to violate their religious commitments by
rejecting the concept of religious accommodations is not necessary because a balance can be
reached between religious freedom, reproductive rights, and LGBT rights by focusing on
accommodating religion where possible without causing direct harm to others).
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The question remains, however, what should happen when such
religious values impact the established rights of others who do not
share the same religious commitments? On one side of the Culture
Wars are the social conservatives who believe that their values—
including religious values—are core American values and can
therefore be enforced by government and that contrary values are
somehow un-American and/or immoral, so not worthy of respect.248
Aligned with the social conservatives on some issues are others
whose deeply held religious values fall on the same side as the social
conservatives on these issues. 249 These values often focus on
reproductive rights and LGBT issues, among other things. 250 From
this point of view, religious individuals and entities should be free to
exclude who they want, and people of faith should be free to run
their businesses as they see fit without government interference. 251
On the other side are individuals who support equality for
diverse groups, including the LGBT community, and view
reproductive freedom as central to a woman’s right to control her
body, medical care, and future. 252 For lack of a better term, I will
refer to this group as “progressives.” Aligned with the progressives
are people of faith and others who believe it is important for each
individual to have dignity and therefore government should not
interfere or impede a woman’s reproductive freedom. 253 For many on
this side of the debate, religious freedom ends where the rights of
others begin. 254 Therefore, religious freedom must give way when
the rights of non-coreligionists are endangered or harmed. 255 This is
more likely to happen in the for-profit context because employees
and customers of larger companies are rarely, if ever, going to all be
co-religionists. In fact, for some on this side of the Culture Wars,
religious freedom itself is impossible because it privileges one set of

248. HUNTER, supra note 22, at 136–45.
249. Id. at 77–104.
250. Id. at 3–12, 49–50, 90–95, 122–26, 176–82, 284–85.
251. Id. at 62–95; Laycock, supra note 10.
252. HUNTER, supra note 22, at 43–48, 78–82, 107–34, 144–45.
253. Id.
254. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2790–91 (2014) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
255. See id. at 2795–96, 2804; Corbin, supra note 5, at 1481–82.
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world-views over others. 256 One concern is that Hobby Lobby may blur
the line between those on this side of the culture wars who support
religious freedom for individuals and traditional religious entities,
and those who view any form of religious freedom as privileging a
particular set of world-views over the rights of others.
2. Traditional religious entities
I have used the term “traditional religious entities” throughout
this Article and it is useful to elaborate on the meaning of this term
before the next sub-section. The term is key because these are the
entities that are most traditionally associated with religious freedom
but which stand to lose the most if the basic concept of religious
freedom is undermined by its expansion to cover for-profit entities.
The term, as used in this Article, refers to those that have long been
understood to be covered under the Free Exercise Clause. These are
also the individuals and entities that RFRA was designed to protect.
First, no one questions that individuals are protected under the
Free Exercise Clause and RFRA. If government seeks to impose on
an individual’s free exercise of religion it must meet the test set forth
in RFRA (or, where applicable, state RFRAs). A straightforward
example of this is where a judge insists that a Muslim woman remove
her hijab or a Jewish man remove his yarmulke in the courtroom.
RFRA clearly prohibits the judge from enforcing this rule. 257
There are a number of religious entities that have also been
traditionally protected under the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA.
The most obvious of these are churches, synagogues, mosques,
temples, etc. 258 The Court long ago acknowledged that while the
Free Exercise Clause (and later RFRA) was clearly designed to
256. See WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
(2007); cf. MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: THE PERILS OF EXTREME RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY (Rev. 2d ed. 2014) (arguing that, while some religious conduct might be protected,
the concept of religious freedom can be misused in a manner that greatly harms third parties);
Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The
Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245 (1994)
(rejecting the idea of special treatment for religion when that treatment would violate the
principle of "equal regard”).
257. Cf. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015) (RLUIPA protects prisoner’s right to
wear a short beard consistent with his faith).
258. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006);
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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protect individuals, it can also protect the entities through which
individuals of shared faith come together to express their religion.259
While some have argued that these entities do not enjoy free exercise
rights, the general consensus among judges, legislators and scholars,
is that they do.
Next are affiliates or auxiliaries of religious entities—for example,
a school or a soup kitchen run by a church. These entities too have
been generally protected under the Free Exercise Clause and
RFRA. 260 In a similar vein, non-profit religious entities like Catholic
Charities or Jewish Family Services, to cite two examples, have also
been protected. 261 These entities are also generally bound by the
requirements of Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. 262
The final, and perhaps most controversial, class of entities
protected under RFRA are hospitals and universities run by religious
entities. Powerful arguments have been made for excluding these
entities from Free Exercise Clause and RFRA protections because
these entities generally serve the broader community. 263 Even so,
hospitals and health care providers already have religious exemptions
to performing religiously objectionable procedures under many
states’ laws and under Federal law. 264 These exemptions themselves

259. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 418 (applying RFRA to such an entity); Corp. of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327,
340–42 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (addressing shared faith under the
Free Exercise Clause).
260. W. Presbyterian Church v. Bd. of Zoning and Adjustment of the D.C., 862 F. Supp.
538 (D.D.C. 1994); Jesus Ctr. v. Farmington Hills Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 544 N.W.2d 698
(Mich. Ct. App. 1996). Of course, just because an entity has free exercise rights, or is
protected by RFRA, does not mean it will win its claim. Daytona Rescue Mission, Inc. v. City
of Daytona Beach, 885 F. Supp. 1554 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
261. See Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 675 (7th Cir. 2013); Jacqueline Gilbert, Note,
When Rights Collide: In a Battle Between Pharmacists’ Right of Free Exercise and Patients’ Right
to Access Contraception, Who Wins?—A Possible Solution for Nevada, 7 NEV. L.J. 212, 230
(2006) (addressing Catholic Charities).
262. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
263. Cf. Brietta R. Clark, When Free Exercise Exemptions Undermine Religious Liberty
and the Liberty of Conscience: A Case Study of the Catholic Hospital Conflict, 82 OR. L. REV.
625, 631, 633−34, 647−48 (2003).
264. Katherine A. White, Note, Crisis of Conscience: Reconciling Religious Health Care
Providers’ Beliefs and Patients’ Rights, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1703, 1705, 1709-11 (1999); see also
42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2012) (codifying federal law known as the “Church Amendment” after
Senator Church who sponsored the law, which protects medical facilities and providers who
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have been controversial. 265 Yet, for purposes of defining “traditional
religious entities,” I include them because they are generally
nonprofit parts of a religious sect’s mission, and in most cases where
exemptions are requested, they are openly serving the religious
mission of the sect. 266 That does not, however, mean that these
entities are as likely to be successful in their RFRA claims as
churches, synagogues, mosques, temples, etc., since the government
may have a greater range of compelling interest when a hospital or
University serves the general public. Even in the case of churches,
synagogues, mosques, and temples, the government may have a
compelling interest in enforcing anti-discrimination laws for nonclergy employees, 267 although this would not apply to religious
discrimination claims. 268
Thus, if a religious university engages in discrimination
prohibited by federal law, it may be sanctioned by, for example,
losing its tax exempt status, even if it asserts a religious basis for the
discrimination. 269 If a religious hospital is the only hospital in a
community, it may lose a negligence claim for failure to provide
appropriate care, 270 and it could possibly be ordered by a court to
allow a doctor to perform a procedure that is medically necessary,
despite the hospital’s religious objections. 271 In other words, a state
RFRA might apply, but these sorts of entities may lose under the
compelling interest analysis due to strong government interests.
3. The legal and public response to Hobby Lobby
At the time of this writing the Hobby Lobby decision has only
been on the books for about one year. Yet, well before the Court
receive certain federal grants from being required to perform, or having their facilities used to
perform, abortions or sterilizations).
265. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 10.
266. Laycock, supra note 10, at 846–48.
267. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct.
694, 707, 710 (2012) (applying the ministerial exception to a “called” teacher who was a
minister, but noting that the exception applies to ministers and similar employees. If
respondent has not been a minister it seems the answer would have been different).
268. Id.; see also Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring).
269. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
270. Clark, supra note 263, at 641–44.
271. Id. at 629–30.
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issued its ruling, concerns over for-profit entities being protected
under RFRAs and the impact this could have on third parties was
building. Hobby Lobby and/or the build-up to the Court’s decision
has led, in part, to the failure of a state RFRA in Michigan; 272 to
serious challenges to RFRAs proposed in Indiana, 273 Georgia, 274 and
Maine; 275 to legislation that could dramatically limit religious
freedom even for traditional legal entities in California; 276 and to
potential weakening of state RFRAs in other states that require
contraceptive coverage under state law. 277 Moreover, public outrage
over the Hobby Lobby decision and the build up to it has blurred the
line between traditional religious entities and for-profit entities, and
has changed the perception of RFRA from being a civil rights or civil

272. Kathleen Gray, Religious Freedom Legislation Stalls in Lansing, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, Dec. 18, 2014, at A13.
273. Tony Cook, Religious Freedom Bills Get Hearing, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 9,
2015, at A1; Abdul-Hakim Shabazz, Editorial, No Service, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 18, 2015,
at A16; Tony Cook & Marisa Kwiatkowski, Religious Freedom Bill is Drafted, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Dec. 27. 2014, at A1; Editorial, Freedom to Discriminate, KOKOMO TRIB. (Feb. 22,
2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.kokomotribune.com/opinion/editorials/editorial-freedom-todiscriminate/article_bd2786da-b92e-11e4-9a51-0357d2050012.html
[hereinafter
KOKOMO TRIB.].
274. April Hunt, Georgia Equality Spokesman Correct on Claim, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan.
21, 2015, at 1B; Peter Berg & David Key, Sr., Law, Religion: Keeping Balance, ATLANTA J.CONST., Jan. 16, 2015, at 12A; Jeff Graham, Editorial, No Threat to Religious Liberty,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 10, 2014, at 10A.
275. Christopher Cousins, Controversial Maine ‘Religious Freedom’ Bill Rejected by
Legislative Committee, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Jan. 23, 2014, 4:24 PM),
http://bangordailynews.com/2014/01/23/politics/controversial-maine-religious-freedombill-rejected-by-legislative-committee/; Mario Moretto, ‘Religious Freedom’ Bill in Maine
Would Lead to Legalized Discrimination, Opponents Say, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Jan. 16, 2014,
7:35 PM), http://bangordailynews.com/2014/01/16/politics/religious-freedom-bill-inmaine-would-lead-to-legalized-discrimination-opponents-say/?ref=relatedBox.
276. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367(i) (West 2014) (requiring all health care
service providers to provide “all of the basic health care services provided in subdivision (b) of
Section 1345”); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1345(b) (West 2003) (defining ‘basic health
services”); Letter from Michelle Rouillard, Director, Dep’t of Managed Health Care of Cal., to
Mark Morgan, Cal. President of Anthem Blue Cross (Aug. 22, 2014),
https://www.dmhc.ca.gov/Portals/0/082214letters/abc082214.pdf.
277. Cf. Brian Dowling, Health Care Ruling Studied For Its Effect On Connecticut,
COURANT
(Jun.
30,
2014),
http://articles.courant.com/2014-06HARTFORD
30/business/hc-connecticut-contraceptive-mandate-questions-20140630_1_coverageguttmacher-institute-insurers (discussing potential conflict between state law requiring
contraceptive coverage and state RFRA).
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liberties statute, to one that threatens civil rights and civil liberties.278
And this is just the beginning.
For those who view Hobby Lobby as an important victory for
religious freedom, the recent experience with the state RFRA
proposed in Michigan should be quite sobering. Even those who
strongly agree with Hobby Lobby cannot ignore the role it played in
undermining of Michigan’s RFRA. As will be shown, RFRA was often
portrayed as a license for companies to discriminate and not meet their
duties under state and federal law, based on religious objections. 279 As

278. See Editorial, The Justices Endorse Imposing Religion on Employees, N.Y. TIMES, July
1, 2014, at A20; Christopher Snowbeck, Hobby Lobby Ruling ‘Opens Floodgates’ to Test
Boundaries, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, July 12, 2014, at A1; Sandhya Somashekhar, Religious
Liberty Push Stirs New Fight: Some Conservatives Seek Legal Right Not to Serve Gay Couples,
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 21, 2014, at C29; Hunt, supra note 274; Berg & Key, supra note 274;
Cook, supra note 273; Shabazz, supra note 273; KOKOMO TRIB., supra note 273; Cousins,
supra note 275; Moretto, supra note 275; Justin A. Hinkley, Report Slams Michigan for
Inequality, LANSING ST. J., Jan. 24, 2015, at A8; Teresa Wiltz, Michigan Religious Freedom
Act May Open Door to Discrimination, Critics Say, SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 21, 2014, at 16A;
Gray, supra note 272; Kendall Stanley, Editorial, Lame is Right, PETOSKEY NEWS-REV. (Dec.
15, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.petoskeynews.com/news/opinion/kendall-stanley—-lameis-right/article_b2fa4bab-5f41-5585-8ab6-cb76ac9e4345.html; Nathan Triplett, Editorial,
Passing Religious Freedom Bill Spells Trouble for Michigan, ARGUS-PRESS (Dec. 14, 2014, 7:00
AM),
http://www.argus-press.com/opinion/guest_commentaries/article_83f6fc3c-832911e4-bffe-c3b8b276ba91.html14, 2014; Editorial, Religious Freedom Bill Wrong for State,
LIVINGSTON COUNTY PRESS, Dec. 14, 2014, at A14 [hereinafter LIVINGSTON COUNTY
PRESS]; Olivia Lewis, Some Local Clergy Not Sold on Bill, BATTLE CREEK ENQUIRER, Dec. 11,
2014, at A2; John Matuszak, Protestors Say GOP Bill is a ‘License to Discriminate’, HERALD
PALLADIUM (Dec. 9, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.heraldpalladium.com/news/local/
protesters-say-gop-bill-is-a-license-to-discriminate/article_728d87af-2c3e-5ed8-8783e0b85761f233.html; Fox 2 Detroit, Pending State Religious Freedom Act a ‘License to
Discriminate’, EQUALITY MICH. (Dec. 9, 2014), https://www.equalitymi.org/mediacenter/in-the-media/pending-state-religious-freedom-act-license-discriminate; Kathleen Gray,
Religious Freedom Bill Passes Out of Michigan House, DETROIT FREE PRESS (December 7,
2014, 9:30 PM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2014/12/04/
michigan-religious-freedom-bill-moves-house/19889979/ [hereinafter Gray, Religious
Freedom Bill Passes]; Editorial, Religious Freedom or Bias Hiding Behind Law, CLARIONLEDGER, July 15, 2015, at A3; Kim Severson, Mississippi Chefs to Protest State Law on the Eve of
Annual New York Picnic, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
05/07/dining/ mississippi-chefs-to-protest-state-law-on-the-eve-of-annual-picnic.html?_r=0.
279. See Hinkley, supra note 278; Wiltz, supra note 278; Gray, Religious Freedom Bill
Passes, supra note 278; Stanley, supra note 278; Triplett, supra note 278; LIVINGSTON
COUNTY PRESS, supra note 278; Lewis, supra note 278; Matuszak, supra note 278; Fox 2
Detroit, supra note 278.
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will also be shown, the for-profit HHS mandate litigation led, in part,
to the failure of state RFRAs in Ohio and Kentucky. 280
The Michigan Religious Freedom Restoration Act, HB 5958,
was introduced on November 13, 2014 by state representative Jase
Bolger. 281 Another bill was introduced that would amend Michigan’s
Elliott Larsen Act (a civil rights statute) to include statewide
protection for gays and lesbians against discrimination in housing
and employment. 282 Notably, that bill did not include transgender
individuals, which led to the proposal of an alternative bill by Rep.
Sam Singh. 283 Had either of these amendments passed the state
House of Representatives it might have provided a statewide
compelling interest for government to protect gays and lesbians from
discrimination based on religious assertions. 284 Representative Bolger
supported both bills. 285 The latter bill seemed especially aimed at forprofit entities since the Elliott Larsen Act exempts traditional
religious entities. 286
From the time HB 5958 was introduced, however, the Michigan
RFRA was portrayed as a license for companies to avoid legal
obligations and to discriminate. 287 On December 4, 2014 the state
house voted 59-50 to pass the Michigan RFRA and it was referred to
the state Senate. 288 Media coverage regularly portrayed the law as a
license for companies to discriminate and avoid legal obligations.289
Television ads did the same. Opponents of RFRA must have been
quietly grateful for the weapon Hobby Lobby gave them.
280. Chrissie Thompson, Sponsors Kill Religious Freedom Bill, LANCASTER EAGLE
GAZETTE, Feb. 27, 2014, at A2 (Ohio); Tom Loftus, Beshear Vetoes Religion Measure,
COURIER-J., Mar. 22, 2013, at A1 (Kentucky); Joseph Gerth, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT:
Fischer Adds His Voice in Opposition, COURIER-J., Mar. 20, 2013, at A1 (Kentucky).
281. H.R. 5958, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2014).
282. Jonathan Oosting, ‘Historic’ Gay Rights Hearing Ends Without Vote on Michigan
Anti-Discrimination
Proposals,
MLIVE
(Dec.
4,
2014,
7:44
AM),
http://www.mlive.com/lansingnews/index.ssf/2014/12/historic_hearing_on_gay_rights.html.
283. Id.
284. RAVITCH, supra note 247 (manuscript at ch. 5).
285. Gray, supra note 272.
286. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2202 (2009).
287. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
288. H.R. 5958, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2014); JOURNAL H.R., 97th Leg., Reg.
Sess. 2099–100 (Mich. 2014).
289. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
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Public support for RFRA weakened further when the state
House voted down the proposed extension of the Elliott Larsen Act
to protect gays and lesbians from discrimination on December 3, just
one day before the house approved RFRA. 290 Concerns about
businesses using RFRA to support discrimination and avoid legal
requirements were raised repeatedly. 291 If traditional religious entities
were the only ones that would have been protected by RFRA, the
debate would have been quite different. Some might have still
objected to allowing even churches to discriminate based on sexual
orientation, but for many that was not the concern.
The concern was stated plainly in numerous news reports,
articles and op-ed pieces around the state. It was that companies and
landlords would be able to discriminate against LGBT individuals
based on religious convictions, 292 pharmacists would be able to refuse
to fill prescriptions for contraceptives, 293 and employers would be
able to fire non-coreligionists, among similar concerns. 294
Others, including Representative Bolger, insisted the bill was
designed to protect religious freedom so that, for example, Jewish
parents could object to autopsies being performed on a child as per
Jewish law, 295 and so forth. 296 The problem was, however, that HB
5958 did not define “person” for purposes of the state religious
freedom protection, and therefore the state supreme court might
have interpreted the state RFRA to include for-profit entities just as
the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the Federal RFRA. 297
The Michigan Supreme Court already protects religious freedom
under the state constitution by applying the pre-Smith compelling
interest test, 298 but that could change in one decision. The state
RFRA, however, was patterned on the Federal RFRA, and since it
290. Gray, Religious Freedom Bill Passes, supra note 278; Stanley, supra note 278;
Matuszak, supra note 278.
291. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
292. Supra note 278.
293. Matuszak, supra note 278 (referencing pharmacists); Stanley, supra note
278 (same).
294. Matuszak, supra note 278 (referencing employment discrimination).
295. Gray, Religious Liberty Bill Passes, supra note 278.
296. Id.
297. H.R. 5958, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2014).
298. McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 729 (Mich. 1998), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 593 N.W.2d 545 tbl. (Mich. 1999).
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did not define the term “person” to exclude for-profit entities, there
was a valid concern that the Michigan Supreme Court might follow
Hobby Lobby if the state RFRA were enacted, even though it did not
follow Smith. 299
Public pressure against the state RFRA was strong and the bill
languished for weeks in the state Senate. Additionally, there was no
guarantee that the Governor would have signed the bill had it made
it to his desk. 300 The state RFRA had become a political hot potato
even for the Republican-controlled Senate, so the Governor was
wary. 301 As the legislative session came to a close there was an
opportunity for the Senate to vote on the bill, but it never came to a
vote and thus the quest for a state RFRA ended in the state Senate. 302
There is little doubt that, if the bill enjoyed broader public support
and was not seen as a license for businesses to discriminate, it would
have passed. 303 Thus, it is not an overstatement to say that without
Hobby Lobby the result might have been different.
If this were an isolated incident, perhaps it could be dismissed. It
is, however, just one example in an evolving trend. As opposed to
the wide-ranging support for RFRA in 1993, today religious
freedom claims are regularly being characterized in the media and by
some legislators as licenses to discriminate. 304 In Arizona, a “religious
liberty bill” that would have included protection for for-profit
businesses was vetoed by Governor Brewer only a few months before
Hobby Lobby was decided. 305 The bill ignited a firestorm of
condemnation and was opposed by women’s rights groups, LGBT
groups, business groups, a number of religious groups, the Chamber
of Commerce, and others. 306 The idea of protecting for-profit
businesses from general laws based on religious objections was seen
299. Id. (applying pre-Smith precedent instead of Smith under state constitution).
300. See Gray, supra note 272.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. See Teresa Wiltz, Michigan Religious Freedom Act May Open Door to Discrimination,
Critics Say, SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 21, 2014, at 16A; Dowling, supra note 277 and
accompanying text.
305. Juliet Eilperin, Conservatives Urge Religious Exemptions to Limit Gay Rights, CHI.
TRIB., Mar. 2, 2014, at C24; Editorial, With Veto, Ariz. Governor Changes Everything, WIS.
RAPIDS DAILY TRIB., Mar. 15, 2014, at A4.
306. Eilperin, supra note 305.
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by many in Arizona and in the national media as backwards
and dangerous. 307
More troubling, however, was the bleed between exempting forprofit businesses and other religious organizations seen in some of
the coverage of the situation in Arizona. 308 Much of the coverage,309
and certainly Governor Brewers’ veto, 310 was based on the protection
the “religious liberty bill” would have afforded for-profit entities,
but some of the rhetoric in Arizona opposed religious exemptions
generally. 311 This was also true in Ohio, Kentucky, and Georgia,
where more traditional RFRA bills failed, in part, because of
concerns they would have allowed for-profit entities to
discriminate. 312 After Hobby Lobby, this bleed between the arguments
against exemptions for for-profit entities and exemptions generally
has increased, as was seen in Michigan. 313 Michigan is not
alone, however.
Recent RFRA legislation in Maine, 314 Indiana, 315 and a new bill in
Georgia316 faced strong opposition that would have been unthinkable
a few years ago. 317 Like the law proposed in Michigan, these laws are
generally modeled on the Federal RFRA that was uncontroversial in
1993. 318 The Indiana law, however, specifically included protection
for for-profit entities. Unlike the other bills mentioned in this section
the Indiana bill passed, but the backlash was intense. This led to
what is called the “Fix,” which amended the law to protect against

307. Id.
308. See supra note 305.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Supra note 281 and accompanying text; Graham, supra note 274 (2014
Georgia Bill).
313. See supra notes 281–303 and accompanying text.
314. Supra note 275.
315. Supra note 273.
316. Hunt, supra note 274; Berg & Key, supra note 274.
317. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
318. Idleman, supra note 10, at 248.
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discrimination by for-profit entities asserting religious freedom
claims. 319 Even so, backlash against the Indiana RFRA remains.
Even in Georgia, where one would think RFRA legislation might
receive a warmer welcome, there has been serious backlash. 320 After
Hobby Lobby, this backlash is especially understandable. Business
groups, LGBT groups, patients’ rights groups, and women’s rights
groups have all spoken out against these state RFRAs as licenses to
discriminate, bad for business in the state, and bad for the freedom
of third parties that might be affected by these exemptions. In
Maine, similar opposition has formed and the bill has been portrayed
by many in the media and by legislators who oppose it as a step
backwards for the state of Maine. 321
Yet, as noted above, most of the exemptions under these laws
would go to religious individuals and entities who were not
considered in the legislative process. 322 Still, the failure to define
“persons” in the acts leaves open the possibility that for-profit
entities will be protected and thus gives the opposition fuel. 323 Most
troubling is that the line between religious exemptions for
individuals and religious entities and those for for-profit entities,
government officials, and those who deal with the public generally
are being blurred. 324 The movement against RFRA is more and more
against religious exemptions generally. 325
Ironically, those legislators promoting RFRA in some state
legislatures are either blind to, or politically incapable of, defining
“person” to protect only religious individuals and traditional
religious entities. 326 This is part of the Culture Wars. Many of those
supporting this legislation do want to protect for-profit entities,
government officials, and others who serve the public generally from
319. S. 101, 119th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015) (original RFRA bill); S. 50,
119th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015) (the “Fix”). Both Acts are codified together
under IND. CODE § 34-13-9 (2015).
320. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
321. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 227–229 and accompanying text.
323. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768–70 (2014) (defining
“person” to include for-profit corporations); supra note 278 (illustrating the public’s negative
response to recent state RFRAs).
324. See supra notes 278–279 and accompanying text.
325. Id.
326. See id.; Laycock, supra note 10, at 868–69.
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anti-discrimination laws based on sexual orientation or from
providing services to which religious individuals object. This may
seem like laudable idealism, but it is a shortsighted strategy. In trying
to protect these individuals from current views on social issues,
protections for religious individuals who do not serve the general
public and traditional religious entities may be sacrificed.
Significantly, the laws that may be most helpful to religious
freedom if they pass are those that seek to redefine “person” in
Federal or state RFRAs to exclude for-profit entities and government
officials. 327 These would protect the core of RFRAs in garden-variety
cases, and perhaps remind the public that most RFRA claims are not
about discrimination or for-profit companies, but rather about
protecting religious freedom for individuals and traditional religious
entities in contexts that do not interfere with others’ civil or
political rights. 328
There has also been proposed legislation since Hobby Lobby that
could be destructive to religious freedom generally. Most notably, a
California regulation that denies religious exemptions even to
traditional religious entities. 329 These are countered by legislation in
still other states attempting to widen RFRA protection for a wider
array of entities, but these latter bills have received much negative
media attention and are only likely to be successful in states where
social conservatives have strong control. 330 Yet, the national trend,
fueled by Hobby Lobby, of characterizing religious exemptions in a
negative way seems to have more momentum at this point. 331
One final trend in a number of states involves a potential conflict
that has arisen since Hobby Lobby between state mandatory
contraceptive coverage laws and state RFRAs (or state constitutional
interpretations that follow pre-Smith legal approaches). 332 Most of
these state mandatory contraception coverage laws have exemptions

327. See, e.g., Protect Women’s Health From Corporate Interference Act, H.R. 5051,
113th Cong. (2014) (introduced in the House); Protect Women’s Health From Corporate
Interference Act, S. 2578, 113th Cong. (2014) (placed on the Senate calendar).
328. Supra note 327.
329. See supra note 276.
330. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 275–321 and accompanying text.
332. Dowling, supra note 277.
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for traditional religious entities. 333 Since Hobby Lobby, there has been
concern in some states that for-profit entities may be exempted.334
Connecticut is an example of a state where some have questioned
this issue. 335 The movement seems to be toward making it clear that
for-profit entities are not exempt from these contraceptive
coverage laws. 336
As the situation in Michigan and the other states addressed
above demonstrate, public perception of religious freedom is
changing. When RFRA was passed more than twenty years ago, it
was supported by a wide range of civil liberties, civil rights, and
religious groups. 337 Today, many of these same groups have shifted
their positions and oppose RFRA legislation. 338 The raison d’etre for
this shift is the impact religious freedom claims can have on innocent
third parties. 339 This concern is obvious when for-profit businesses
are protected by RFRA. 340
RFRA was once widely seen as landmark legislation protecting
the religious freedom of those who are not considered in the
legislative process. 341 Now it is seen as a threat to women, members
of the LGBT community, and others who may be harmed if certain
religious beliefs are accommodated. 342 When homeowners rented a
room and discriminated against LGBT individuals it made

333. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-826(Z) (2010 & Supp. 2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. §
38a-530e (2012); MO. REV. STAT. § 376.1199.4 (2012) (held preempted by the Federal ACA
in Mo. Ins. Coal. v. Huff, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1020 (E.D. Mo. 2013)); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
17B:26-2.1y (West 2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-46-44(c) (2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 2718-57 (2008).
334. This concern has received a good deal of attention in Connecticut. Dowling, supra
note 277.
335. Id.
336. See supra notes 277–278.
337. NUSSBAUM, supra note 12, at 157–58, 160–61; Idleman, supra note 10, at 248; J.
Thomas Sullivan, Requiem for RFRA: A Philosophical and Political Response, 20 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L.J. 295 (1998).
338. Garfield, supra note 226.
339. See supra note 281; Corbin, supra note 5, at 1481–82.
340. See supra notes 304–307 and accompanying text.
341. Idleman, supra note 10, at 248–51.
342. See supra note 278 and accompanying text; Mary Anne Case, Why “Live-and-LetLive” Is Not a Viable Solution to the Difficult Problems of Religious Accommodation in the Age of
Sexual Civil Rights, 88 SO. CAL. L. REV. 463 (2015); Oleske, supra note 120.

104

02.RAVITCH.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

55

8/4/2016 6:07 PM

Be Careful What You Wish for

headlines, 343 but we still spoke in terms of that individual’s religious
freedom balanced against the state interest in prohibiting
discrimination. The homeowner might have won or lost in court
depending on how the court viewed the weighing of those interests.
Today, however, larger corporate landlords may try to discriminate
citing Hobby Lobby. Whether they win or lose their cases, however,
each such case will further alienate the public from the concept of
religious freedom.
In a debate about Hobby Lobby several months before the case
was decided, I argued that if Hobby Lobby wins, within five years
there will be a significant increase in the backlash against religious
freedom and that religious freedom would be eroded through the
more-is-less phenomenon, legislative activity, public perception, and
a failure to distinguish between traditional religious entities and forprofit entities. It seems I was naive in thinking it would take five
years for the decline in the perception of religious freedom to gain
significant support from the Hobby Lobby decision. At the time of this
writing, it has been about a year since Hobby Lobby was decided and
Hobby Lobby has given significant PR support to those opposed to
religious freedom.
As Douglas Laycock has explained, both sides in the Culture
Wars have dug in their heels, and co-existence of religious freedom
and personal freedom is less the goal of either side:
There is no apparent prospect of either side agreeing to live and let
live. Each side respects the liberties of the other only when it lacks
the votes to impose its own views. Each side is intolerant of the
other; each side wants a total win. The mutual insistence on total
wins is very bad for religious liberty. The religious side persists in
trying to regulate other people’s sex lives and relationships so long
as it thinks it has a chance of success. That motivates much of the
other side’s hostility to religious liberty. And those on the other
side persist in demanding not only the right to live their own lives
by their own values, but also the right to force religious objectors

343. See, e.g., Mike McKinnon, Calls to End Gay Renter Discrimination, GLOBAL NEWS
(Mar. 28, 2014, 7:54 PM), http://globalnews.ca/news/1238128/calls-to-end-gayrenter-discrimination/.
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to assist them in doing so. And to that end, they are making
arguments calculated to destroy religious liberty. 344

In the long run, Hobby Lobby will add much weight to the
political arguments on one side of the debate, and that side is not the
one concerned about religious freedom. Failure to compromise in
the public sphere when society is quickly changing in ways that go
against what you believe, which may be important for some faiths or
some people of faith, may be a victory of faith over modernity, but it
is a sure way to lose in court and the court of public opinion
over time.
IV. HOBBY LOBBY WAS WRONGLY DECIDED
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Hobby Lobby responds to some of
the majority opinion’s distortions of precedent and statutory
meaning. 345 Specifically, Justice Ginsburg addressed: 1. The
majority’s odd claim that RLUIPA somehow amended both the
definition of who is protected under RFRA and the breadth of
RFRA; 346 2. The majority’s failure to adequately address pre-Smith
precedent holding religious accommodations should not generally be
given when doing so will result in harm to third persons; 347 3. The
majority’s failure to adequately address the substantial burden
question; 348 4. The majority’s failure to address the nature of the
government’s compelling interest in order to better consider what
means would be narrowly tailored to serve that interest; 349 and 5.
The majority’s novel implication that government can be made to
pay the cost for religious exemptions if doing so would be narrowly
tailored to meet the government’s compelling interest. 350
Instead of regurgitating the dissenting opinion, I will address
each of these points where appropriate. There are, however, other
problems with the majority opinion, and this section will focus

344. Id. at 879–80; Laycock, supra note 10, at 879.
345. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2787 (2014) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
346. Id. at 2792.
347. Id. at 2801–04.
348. Id. at 2797–99.
349. Id. at 2799–801.
350. Id. at 2802–03.
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heavily on those. This section will also address an important point
made by the majority that Justice Ginsburg’s dissent perhaps does
not take seriously enough, namely, the nature of lived religion and
concerns about facilitating evil, 351 or what Doug NeJaime and Reva
Siegel have called “complicity” claims. 352 Interestingly, while the
majority is to be commended for raising these issues, it fails utterly to
address what relationship these concepts should have to government
action, nor does it seriously balance these concepts against
competing concerns.
By addressing the nature of lived religion, the majority addresses
something that few courts have considered. It is easy for people who
do not experience lived religion to misunderstand, or be unable to
empathize with, those who do. 353 While the Hobby Lobby Court’s
substantial burden analysis is a mess, the Court makes a valiant effort
to explain that for people like the Greens and the Hahns religion is a
fundamental aspect of being that is inseparable from other parts of
their lives. 354 It is not something one only does when one goes to
church, synagogue, mosque, or temple.
Those in the secular world often scoff at this, but such scoffing is
unfair, disrespectful, and sad in a pluralistic society. In fact, it is
sometimes the very secular progressives who scoff at lived religion
that should most understand it. After all, most progressives’ values
are not just something they have when they go to rallies. Rather,
these values are often lived every day and in every interaction
with others.
As a person who lives religion, but shares a number of values
with progressives such as support for marriage equality and
reproductive rights, I view these life experiences as both embedded
in who I am. The best way to address these views (even internally) is
through a sort of dialogue. All too often, the main dialogue between
those with lived religion and those with values that make lived
religion hard to understand, is one filled with caricatures
and strawmen.

351.
352.
353.
354.

Id. at 2764–68, 2775–77 (majority opinion).
See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 10.
See HUNTER, supra note 22 and accompanying text.
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764–68.
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The Court, ironically, captures lived religion well, but then
utterly fails to grasp the value of reproductive rights that can be just
as central to people’s lives as lived religion can be. 355 In doing so, it
pre-sets the outcome without ever addressing how lived religion can
be balanced against other central rights and values. This failure was
the loss of a golden opportunity for the Court to address an issue
simmering at the heart of freedom of religion claims that affect the
rights of others. Of course, this failure might be a result of the fact
that any serious analysis of this question based on precedent would
be likely to result in the claimants losing, since the rights that would
be affected are the rights of employees who do not necessarily share
the for-profit business owners’ religious faith. 356
The supposed ease of less restrictive means that the majority
relies on to skirt this question does not cure this deficiency in the
opinion. First, as Justice Ginsburg explains in dissent, there is
precedent stating that religious accommodations should not be
granted, even to individuals, when the rights of others would be
negatively affected. 357 As explained in Part I and below, nothing in
RLUIPA makes this precedent irrelevant to RFRA claims. After
Hobby Lobby the HHS implemented the same accommodation for
for-profit entities that was already in place for religious non-profits.
Significantly this does not mean employees of for-profit entities with
religious objections to contraceptive coverage are protected in the
long-run because a new President or Secretary of Health and
Human Services could reject this option either due to the
cost of implementation
or
substantive
disagreement
with
the accommodation.
Moreover, the current accommodation is being challenged in the
United States Supreme Court by religious non-profits because it
requires the entities to certify that they oppose contraceptive
coverage which sets the accommodation in motion resulting in
contraceptive coverage. The religious non-profits challenging the
accommodation argue that the certification requirement makes them
complicit in the ultimate prescribing and distributing of the

355. Id. at 2787–90, 2800–03 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
356. Id. at 2799–2803.
357. Id. at 2801–04; Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
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contraceptives they oppose on religious grounds. 358 Of course, in
Hobby Lobby the Court equated nonprofits with for-profits, 359 so if
the current challenge before the United States Supreme Court to the
accommodation is successful, for-profit entities might also challenge
the accommodation, alleging the requirement that they self-certify
makes them complicit in something that imposes a substantial
burden on their religion.
Thus, the Court sets forth accommodations that may not be
politically or financially feasible in the long run or which may violate
RFRA under the Court’s approach, and then suggests these
hypothetical solutions mean the employees’ harm would be
“precisely zero.” 360 This does not balance the importance of lived
religion to the Greens and Hahns with the rights of female
employees. It is a potential imposition of the Greens’ and Hahns’
lived religion on their female employees, 361 with the hypothetical
hope of a government-funded solution if all else fails. Sadly, it is an
imposition made without adequately addressing the underlying
tension between the accommodation of lived religion and the
negative impact such accommodations can on rare occasions have on
the rights of others.
Second, the government-payer option the Court suggests is
unprecedented because, despite the Court’s protestations otherwise,
the least restrictive means analysis opens up the possibility that the
government could be required to foot the bill for remedying the
negative effect of religious accommodations on third parties. 362
Government funding is a means that could be argued as an
alternative in many cases and certainly in cases involving
contraceptive care. 363 The government funding option becomes a
license for closely held companies with religious objections to deny
benefits to employees so long as a court finds government can fund
the benefits, 364 and therefore the harm is “precisely zero.” 365
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.

See supra note 30.
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768–69.
Id. at 2760.
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Corbin, supra note 5, at 1481.
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2801–03 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2801–02.
Id.
Id. at 2760 (majority opinion).
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Yet, if as the Court seems to assert, accommodating lived
religion can require government financial support we would expect
the Court to have more to support this result than its own bare
assertion. We might at least expect a broad statement about the value
of lived religion being something that government should financially
support. Of course, this would raise Establishment Clause questions.
Regardless, all we have is the Court’s bare assertion. There is nary a
citation in support of the proposition that government can be made
to directly fund religious accommodations under RFRA or preSmith law. 366
Third, while the Court minimized the burden on third-party
rights under the facts in Hobby Lobby, the decision is not so
limited. 367 Every time government creates a substantial burden on
someone’s religion, even if government has a compelling interest in
protecting the rights of third parties, there may always be a
government-funded solution so long as the courts are willing to find
one that is not unduly burdensome. 368 Those who question the
breadth of the majority opinion on this point should pay particular
attention to footnote thirty-seven, which suggests that the majority
may have no problem with a variety of impositions on the rights of
third parties in order to accommodate religion. 369
Yet, at the core, there is something profound in the majority’s
recognition of lived religion. Put yourself in the shoes of the Greens
and the Hahns. You have lived your life according to a set of values,
beliefs, practices, and principles that come from your religion, your
heart, your mind, and if you believe in one, your soul. These values,
beliefs, and principles are part of who you are. You have built a
business and run it consistently with those values to the greatest
extent you can. Now the government has come along and told you
that you must do something, even indirectly, that would facilitate
evil—or if you don’t like the word evil—that would harm the world
in an irreversible way. This is not just an opinion you have. It is
something you know to be true, even if others may disagree. You are
not a lawyer or a scholar. All you know is you built this business and

366.
367.
368.
369.
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Id. at 2780–82.
See generally id. at 2751.
Id. at 2802 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2781 n.37 (majority opinion).
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everyone employed there has benefitted from that. Surely you have
benefitted too, but you have done a lot to use those benefits to
support your values and beliefs. If you don’t do what the
government wants you will face fines that could put you out of
business or require you to lay off workers.
This is how the Greens and Hahns experienced the HHS
Mandate. It was not just a legal duty for them. It was an imposition
of a requirement that they aid—in their minds—in the killing of an
innocent being. From their perspective whether they were directly or
indirectly aiding in the killing, they were complicit nonetheless. 370
None of this means they should win the case, but it does mean
that it would have been a mistake for the Court to have
unflinchingly followed Justice Ginsburg’s approach. Just as the
majority undervalues the impact on female employees of its imposed
accommodation, Justice Ginsburg underestimates the nature of lived
religion for the Greens and Hahns. In the end, however, Justice
Ginsburg’s legal analysis is vastly better than the majority’s because it
is far more consistent with prior precedent, does not play games with
the impact RLUIPA had on RFRA, addresses—even if it
inadequately values lived religion in doing so—the relationship
between religious freedom claims and impacts on third parties, and,
of course, does not buy into the incredible proposition that
government could pay for wide-ranging religious accommodations
regardless of whether government is ever likely to enact or fund
such accommodations.
The Hobby Lobby Court’s disregard of precedent and creation of
new doctrines does not stop there. As explained in Part I, and in
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, the majority opinion claims that RLUIPA
somehow amended the substance of RFRA by no longer connecting
RFRA with pre-Smith law. 371 This is not what RLUIPA did. 372 Unless
the Hobby Lobby Court has created a new concept of statutory
interpretation where a subsequent statute can silently amend a prior
statute on matters specifically spelled out in the prior statute, while
disregarding other far more likely ways in which the language in the

370. Cf. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 10 (addressing complicity based claims for
religious exemption).
371. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761–62.
372. Id. at 2792 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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later statute could affect the earlier statute, the majority’s error
regarding the relationship of RLUIPA and RFRA seems inescapable.
This is important because the majority’s reasoning suggests that
pre-Smith law does not govern interpretation under RFRA. Maybe
the Court engaged in this odd exercise because there is a pre-Smith
decision that seems to specifically address the question of for-profit
entities. In that decision the Court held for-profit entities are bound
to follow regulations binding on all for-profits even where a forprofit has a religious objection to doing so. In United States v. Lee,
the Court held:
Congress and the courts have been sensitive to the needs flowing
from the Free Exercise Clause, but every person cannot be shielded
from all the burdens incident to exercising every aspect of the right
to practice religious beliefs. When followers of a particular sect
enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they
accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are
not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are
binding on others in that activity. Granting an exemption from
social security taxes to an employer operates to impose the
employer’s religious faith on the employees. 373

It doesn’t get much more direct than that. The majority
misstates the holding from this highly relevant precedent and pays it
short shrift by suggesting Lee is relevant only when broad taxes like
social security are involved. 374 The Lee case was indeed about a
religious exemption from social security taxes, but the above quoted
excerpt from the holding is not so limited. 375
Aside from the obvious suggestion that for-profit companies
were not covered under the Free Exercise Clause prior to Smith—
and therefore are not covered under RFRA, at least in cases involving
government programs 376—Lee teaches us another lesson. After Lee,
Congress, which had already exempted individual Amish from paying
Social Security taxes because of the Amish communities’
demonstrated commitment to social welfare for community
members, created an exemption to social security taxes for Amish

373.
374.
375.
376.
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455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982).
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783.
Lee, 455 U.S. at 261.
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businesses that primarily employ Amish employees. 377 If Congress
wanted for-profit businesses to be protected by RFRA, legislation
explicitly stating this would be a better way to achieve this than
imposition by the Court.
One final note. There is something else missing in the majority’s
analysis. The Court does not engage in the “private choice” analysis
it has relied on in so many cases in recent years. 378 Private-choice
analysis means that state action can be cut off when the choices of
third parties are said to intervene. 379 This type of analysis has most
commonly been used under the Establishment Clause. 380
For example, the Court has held that if government creates a
program that ends up funneling large amounts of money to
predominantly religious schools there is no violation of the
Establishment Clause so long as the decision to send the students to
those schools was the private choice of the parents. 381 This choice is
said to cut off the state action. 382 In other words, it cuts off the
causal chain between the initial state action of funding the program
and the end result that 94.6% of that funding ended up going to
religious schools representing only one or two denominations. 383
I think this private-choice analysis is misguided, 384 but it is
mystifying that the Court failed to address it in Hobby Lobby. Clearly,
any money that flows from the employers in Hobby Lobby as a result
of the government program does so only as a result of a multitude of
private choices by employees. A female employee would have to
choose in consultation with her doctor to use one of the alleged
abortifacients out of the many possible means of birth control,
actually use the abortifacient, and pay for it using her insurance.
Under the Court’s private choice approach, this would cut off any

377. Exemption Act of 1988, 26 U.S.C. §3127 (2012).
378. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (applying private-choice analysis
to voucher program challenged under the Establishment Clause); Corbin, supra note 5 (raising
the private-choice argument in the context of the HHS mandate).
379. Zelman, 536 U.S. 639.
380. Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Neutrality: Broad
Principles, Formalism, and the Establishment Clause, 38 GA. L. REV. 489 (2004).
381. Zelman, 536 U.S. 639.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. RAVITCH, supra note 167; Ravitch, supra note 380.
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connection between the government’s HHS requirement and the
harm imposed on the complainants. Moreover, to the extent it
would be relevant, a similar analysis could be used to cut off the
connection between the employers’ provision of insurance plans and
the ultimate use of those plans by employees for a particular
treatment. Given the other problems with the Hobby Lobby opinion
mentioned above, the Court’s failure to address the private choice
doctrine seems odd.
A simple response to this line of reasoning is that the privatechoice analysis does not apply in this context because the concern is
whether the employer itself is facilitating evil, not whether the
private choice cuts off the government’s involvement. Yet, according
to the Court private choice can cut a causal chain, 385 and thus it may
cut the legal causal chain from the employer to the use of the
contraceptives. 386 This may be little solace to the employer who does
not find such formalistic distinctions to be an accurate description of
reality. After all, the government is demanding that they provide a
benefit that makes them complicit in what they view as a sin. Thus,
the employer believes it is facilitating evil despite the legal line. 387 Of
course, the point here is not that the employer would be wrong in
this context. Rather, the private-choice analysis used in cases like
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris could be abandoned. 388 Until it is,
however, it seems odd that the Hobby Lobby Court did not address
this line of analysis, which seems especially relevant in the context of
a claim that the provision of a benefit that is only used through the
private decisions of employees is somehow attributable to the
employer. The Court’s failure to address this is odd indeed, but it is
only one of the many oddities in the Court’s Hobby Lobby reasoning.
CONCLUSION
The Hobby Lobby decision has galvanized people on all sides of
the culture wars. When the dust settles, the impact of Hobby Lobby
will most likely be a reduction in free exercise protection for

385. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 639.
386. Corbin, supra note 5.
387. Laycock, supra note 10.
388. Ravitch, supra note 380 (recommending that the Zelman private-choice approach,
or at least its claim to neutrality, be abandoned).
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individuals and traditional religious entities. The Federal RFRA, state
RFRAs and RLUIPA are likely to be interpreted less broadly as forprofit entities bring cases that set precedent under those statutes.
Moreover, public support for RFRA will continue to wane.
Over time it will be the bread-and-butter religious freedom
plaintiffs that will pay the price for Hobby Lobby—religious students
seeking exemptions to school rules that harm their religious practice;
prisoners who need Kosher or Halal food; Native Americans whose
religious freedom is threatened by the application of a law for which
an exemption could easily be made; adult Jehovah’s Witnesses who
do not want blood transfusions; or churches seeking to use their
facilities to feed the poor based on their religious calling to do so.
We have repeatedly witnessed the more-is-less phenomenon in
civil rights and civil liberties cases. There is no reason to expect
RFRA to buck this trend, especially since the public is quickly tiring
of those who seek religious accommodation that could directly and
negatively affect third parties, and is increasingly viewing religious
freedom as synonymous with a license to discriminate. In responding
to public pressure and social change legislators and judges may not
always distinguish between traditional religious freedom claims and
those of for-profit entities.
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